Maritime Liability of the United States by Editors,
1952]
NOTES
THE MARITIME LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
The enormous expansion in the activities of the federal government
during the last forty years has given rise to a complementary increase in
the number of claims preferred against the national government. The
most elementary principles of justice and fair play have dictated that these
claims should, where proper, be paid. Thus the question has arisen in what
fashion should they be presented and, if proven, satisfied. The early exclu-
sive remedy by way of private bill in Congress proved not only discouraging
and uncertain for the claimant, but burdensome for the Congress as well.
Starting with the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855 and continuing
through the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 in 1946, there has
been an ever-increasing tendency to submit claims against the federal gov-
ernment to judicial or quasi-judicial handling. The subjection of claims
in admiralty to judicial process has been of particular importance since the
number of claims arising each year against the federal government as the
largest single owner of shipping in the world, is enormous. The acts which
waive the immunity of the federal government in admiralty 2 are, of course,
of primary importance to practitioners at the admiralty bar. But, more
than that, their judicial treatment is of interest to lawyers at large; for in
the judicial attitude towards actions under these waiver-of-immunity acts,
there may be found hints as well of what may be expected to occur under
the Tort Claims Act and elsewhere. The policies of all the waiver statutes
and the problems arising under them are similar, if not identical. With this
consideration in mind, therefore, this study will be devoted to an analysis
of the development of the waiver-of-immunity acts in the law of the sea.
THE TRANSITION FROM IMMUNITY TO LIABILITY
Sovereign Immunity: The American Background.-Although an ex-
amination of the political principles underlying the'legal concept of the im-
munity of a sovereign from suit is beyond the scope of this note,8 it is proper
to sketch briefly the state of the law of sovereign immunity in America prior
to the passage of the Shipping Act of 1916.4 Customarily, any such dis-
cussion begins with the opinion of Chief justice Marshall in The Exchange.
5
1. 60 STAT. 843 (1946), as amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (Supp. 1949).
2. The Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
H§ 741-752 (1946), and The Public Vessels Act, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), as amended,
46 U.S.C. 99 781-790 (1946).
3. A monumental treatise dealing with the theeoretical basis of Sovereign Im-
munity is Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALx L. . 1, 129, 229,
326 (1924); 36 YALE, L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); 28 CoL. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928).
4. 39 STAT. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1946).
5. 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
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In that case, the Chief Justice laid it down that for reasons of sovereign
independence, a vessel of Napoleon's navy was absolutely immune from the
process of our courts. Implicit in this decision, of course, was a like con-
clusion as to the immunity of the United States. As a matter of fact, that
point had long been laid at rest. In Moitez v. The South Carolina, decided
by the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania in 1781, it was held that mariners
enlisting upon a man o'war of the United States could have no libel against
the ship or her owner for wages due. The rationale of these two leading
cases was later articulated in the leading case of The Siren.7 There it was
explained that while a cause of action could arise and exist against the
sovereign, it was unenforceable as against the government and its property
as long as the property remained in the possession of the State. This posi-
tion was in sharp contrast with the alternative possibility that because "the
King can do no wrong" no claim could possibly arise against him. The
critical difference between the two positions was this: where a cause of
action arose against a government ship and she was subsequently sold into
private hands, the party aggrieved could libel her in the hands of the new
owners. Cases illustrating this distinction and holding that a maritime lien
"followed the ship into private hands" were not uncommon.8 A series of
cases handed down in the middle of the nineteenth century explained the
political basis of this position on the ground that while the claim existed, it
was unthinkable (a) that the Federal Government should be forced to re-
spond in damages to action in personam or (b) that the possession or prop-
erty of the United States should be distributed by an action in rem.9
In this state the general admiralty law continued until 1922, though
much reduced in its application due to the passage of the Shipping Act of
1916 and the Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920. In that year, however, the
doctrine came before the searching scrutiny of Justice Holmes in the case
of The Western Maid.10 Certain public vessels bad negligently collided
with the plaintiffs' craft, had been sold into private hands and were being
libelled in rem for the damage they had caused. Epigrammatically stating
that "legal obligations that exist but cannot-be enforced are ghosts that are
seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp,"" Holmes speaking for a
divided Court, overruled The Siren and held that no cause of action had
6. Bee 422, Fed. Cas. No. 9,697 (Pa. 1781).
7. 7 Wall. 152 (1868).
8. The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929 (S.D. N.Y. 1919); The F. J. Luckenbach, 267 Fed.
931 (S.D. N.Y. 1920); The Newark, 278 Fed. 215 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
9. Briggs v. The Light-Boats, 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865) ; U.S. v. Douglas
(The Davis), 10 Wall. 15 (U.S. 1869) ; The Thomas A. Scott, 90 Fed. 746 (1864).
An interesting case during this period is United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumn. 308
(1838), in which Justice Story compelled the Federal Government to make up its
share in a general average on the ground that the government should pay its way
when it engaged in commercial ventures. This decision, smacking of the "fiscal"
exception in Continental Law described in Borchard, op. cit. supra note 3, 28 Co.
L. REv. 577, 594 (1928), is remarkable for the modern approach and the authority
of its author; but it cannot be characterized as the the prevailing law.
10. 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
11. Id. at 433.
ever arisen against the ships. This dramatic reversal of established law
had but one thing to recommend it: it made it easier for the United States
to dispose of the huge tonnage of idle shipping then on hand. The law was
suddenly committed to a view of sovereign immunity based on the precept
that "the king can do no wrong." It must be confessed that the mischief
of the decision was not great, for within three years the process of sub-
jecting all government ships to liability was completed.,2  Nevertheless the
holding, because it overturned a long and well-considered line of authority,
was regrettable.
It was mitigated by one exception. Where the United States could be
prevailed upon to consent to suit, whether by general appearance in defense
to a libel or by filing an original libel itself, causes of action could be
prosecuted against it. Holmes himself laid this down in The Thekla,'3
a decision which was in theory incompatible with The Western Maid.
For if no cause of action could arise at the time the damage was done, how
could it possibly arise when the government later submitted to suit? That
would amount to unilateral creation of a "wrong" by the government where
one had never existed before. Nevertheless, the exception stood and has its
meaning to this very day.
The Passage and Purpose of the Waiver Statutes.-Prior to the first
world war the United States government did not bulk large in maritime
matters. With a relatively small navy and with virtually no involvement
in mercantile marine, the sovereign was responsible for a comparatively
trifling number of ships. A concomitant of this was that the volume of
claims arising was small and could readily be handled in Congress. How-
ever, as a result of the tremendous demand for shipping occasioned by the
war and the heavy toll of private craft taken by submarines, the United
States by 1916 found itself committed to a great program of government
ship building and operation. Faced with the enormous volume of claims
that this would necessarily involve, the Congress in the Shipping Act of
1916 took the first step toward abolishing the sovereign immunity of the
United States. In § 9 of that Act ' 4 it provided that ships of the United
States should be subject to "all the laws, regulations and liabilities govern-
ing merchant vessels" so long as they were employed "solely as merchant
vessels." The purpose of this section, in so far as it was ever expressed,
was to protect privately owned craft from the "unfair" competition of
claims-free government ships.' 5 As it turned out, however, the provision
was quite unnecessary. In Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation,16 the Supreme Court held that the Emer-
12. By the passage in 1925 of the Public Vessels Act.
13. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924); contra, The
Barendrecht, 286 Fed. 386 (S.D. N.Y. 1922). See the Nuestra Senora de Regla,
108 U.S. 92 (1883); The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903).
14. 39 STAT. 730 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1946).
15. See The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246, 254-5 (1919) ; The Ceylon Maru, 266
Fed. 396, 398 (D. Md. 1920).
16. 258 U.S. 549 (1922) and see United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491 (1921).
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gency Fleet Corporation,'1 the instrumentality through which the govern-
ment conducted all of its merchant shipping operations, was so far distin-
guishable from the Federal Government as not to be immune from suit. A
consequence of this decision and of the Act'18 was that vessels of the United
States were subject to arrest in proceedings in rem.' 9
The inconvenience to the United States resulting from the subjection
of government ships to arrest led to the passage of the Suits in Admiralty
Act in 1920. Since the Shipping Act had already subjected government
merchantmen to all the liabilities of private craft, which was as great an
acceptance of liability as the nation could fairly be expected to undertake,
the immediate purpose of the Suits in Admiralty Act was to abolish the
privilege of arrest.20  This it did in its first section.2 ' It then provided
that a claimant might bring a suit in personam against the United States
or the Fleet Corporation in every case where he might have brought a suit
in rem against a private operator.22 However, this substituted action might
be judged by principles of substantive law applicable to suits in rem.2 The
net result of the Shipping Act of 1916 and of the Suits in Admiralty Act
was to subject the United States to a very wide liability for claims concern-
ing their "merchant vessels." 24  There remained a vast class of "public
vessels" excluded. The Congress addressed itself to the problems created
by such craft in the Public Vessels Act of 1925.
While the general purpose of the Congress in passing that Act is
clear, the extent of that purpose is obscure. It appears that in 1924 a bill
17. The U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. has successively become
the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, The U.S. Maritime Com-
mission and (today) the Federal Maritime Board. It, and its successors, have always
handled U.S. merchant ships.
18. The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246 (1919), which determined that government
craft were subject to arrest in proceedings in rem, preceded the Sloan Shipyards
Case and was decided solely on the basis of the Shipping Act. However, had Sloan
Shipyards been decided prior thereto, it would have been unnecessary to refer to the
Act to find that the Fleet Corporation's ships were subject to arrest. Thus, there
was in fact a dual-basis upon which the Lake Monroe could rest.
19. The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246 (1919).
20. SEN. REP. No. 223, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); H.R. REP. No. 497, 66th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1919); Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 579 (1943);
Nahmeh v. U.S., 267 U.S. 122, 124 (1925).
21. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §741 (1946).
22. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §742 (1946). This provision has been held
to change the result in Sloan Shipyards as to any claim connected with a merchant
vessel. By permitting a claimant to institute an action in personam against the
Fleet Corporation it has been held the Act provided the excluive remedy against the
corporation and therefore an action at law or in admiralty generally against it was
no longer possible. See cases and text at notes 70, 71 infra.
It has been held that by §§ 1, 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act action in rem is
forbidden to the extent that The Fleet Corporation cannot even abandon a hull to
creditors with any legal effect. Hudson Trading Co. v. United States, 28 F.2d 744
(3d Cir. 1928) ; but see United States v. Neptune Line, 12 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1926).
23. 41 STAT. 526 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §743 (1946).
24. The qualifying language in the Shipping Act is that the vessels concerned
must be "employed solely as merchant vessels," 39 STAT. 730 (1916), 46 U.S.C.
§ 808 (1946). In the Suits in Admiralty Act it is: "employed as a merchant vessel
or is a tugboat operated by [the Fleet Corporation] ... " 41 STAT. 525 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 742.
was introduced in the House which was designed, inter alia, to remove
the existing limitation of the Suits in Admiralty Act to merchant vessels
alone.25  It would have resulted in subjecting the government to the same
wide liability in respect to public vessels as the Suits in Admiralty Act pro-
vided for mercantile craft. However, that bill was not passed because it did
not have the unqualified approval of the executive departments concerned.
Instead, a bill which was then before the House to waive governmental im-
munity with respect to "damages caused by collision by a public vessel" 26
was amended to read "damages caused by a public vessel." This latter
wording found its way into the Public Vessels Act as eventually enacted
2 7
The question was naturally mooted: What significance had the change in
wording? The House Report on the bill as thus amended stated that its
"chief purpose" was "to grant private owners . . . a right of action when
their vessels . . . have been damaged as the result of a collision with
any Government-owned vessel, though engaged in public service." 28 How-
ever, the sponsors of the bill in both Houses stated that it was intended to
extend to damages done "by collision, or other fault of Government vessels
and Government agents." 29 In this unhappy state the Act was passed.
From what has been set forth above, it must be clear that the purposes
of the Suits in Admiralty Act and of the Public Vessels Act were divergent
in at least some measure. Nevertheless it has been said that they are "to
be construed together as part of a plan to give to private . . . (ship-
owners) . . . the same right of recovery from government . . . which
they have against each other." 8o This conclusion is fortified by the fact
that the later Act provides that suits under its auspices shall proceed in
accordance with the provisions of the earlier one.3 ' There can be no doubt
that, at least to some extent, the two Acts should be taken together; for
both share the same general purposes-to relieve the Congress of the burden
of private bills and to satisfy nautical claims against the government. The
remainder of this study will be devoted to a consideration of how well the
courts have fulfilled these purposes and of how they have viewed the Acts
together.
25. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion which follows on the Congressional
purpose in the passage of the Public Vessels Act is drawn from Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 460 (1947), and Justice
Reed's opinion in Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945), both
of which contain a wealth of congressional data.
26. H.R. 6989, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
27. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1946).
28. H.R. REP. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (emphasis added).
29. 66 CONG. REc. 2087 (1924) (emphasis added). Representative Underhill,
the bill's sponsor, stated that it "allows suits . . . to be brought by [shipowners]
whose property has been damaged by collision or other fault of Government vessels
and Government Agents." Senator Bayard in the Senate said that "it would give
a person aggrieved because of an accident by reason of the shortcomings of a
United States Ship the right to . . . prosecute his action." 66 CONG. REc. 3560
(1924).
30. United States v. Caffey, Judge, 141 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1944).
31. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §782 (1946).
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THE SCOPE OF THE AcTs
Persons to Whom the Waiver of Immunity Extends.-'Neither the
Suits in Admiralty Act nor the Public Vessels Act in terms restrict the class
of persons who may benefit by them. Nevertheless, the courts have made a
few exceptions. The first excepted personality is any agency or depart-
ment of the United States Government.32 This exception is based upon the
conclusion that a suit between instrumentalities of the Federal Government
is not a "case or controversy" to which the judicial power of the United
States may be Congressionally extended under Art. III, § 2 of the Con-
stitution. This qualification has the practical disadvantage of making it
exceedingly difficult for a government agency to procure comprehensive
private marine insurance, for the subrogated marine insurer is barred as
well. However, it is scarcely of great importance since it is largely a matter
of "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
The second exception is of greater human interest; all members of the
armed forces have been judicially barred. At first it was supposed that the
reason for this exclusion was to be found in the fact that negligent injury
to a sailor aboard a man o'war could hardly be said to be "caused by a
public vessel." 3 Now, however, it seems settled that the rule is founded
upon the policy of the Pension and Property-Damage Acts, which are said
to overrule the policy of the waiver act and to provide the exclusive
remedy. 34 With this result, too, there can be little argument.
A real problem has arisen with regard to the third category, however.
Those people involved are civilian sailors serving aboard public "vessels
under civil service. As civil servants they are entitled to compensation for
injuries under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, a rather less
generous equivalent of the Pension Acts available to soldiers and sailors.
The Third Circuit has lately held that such persons are barred from suits
for personal injuries under the Suits in Admiralty and the Public Vessel
Acts.35  The reasons advanced were that such seamen generally serve
beside Navy sailors, are subject to the same discipline and should have
analagous remedies. The opinion of the Third Circuit, however, appears
definitely to be in the minority. The two other circuits and two districts
which have faced the problem have decided the issue the other way.3 6 This
latter view, that civil service employees may collect under the Public
Vessels Act, appears preferable. It is incongruous to say that while civilians
aboard merchantmen may sue the government, civilians aboard public
32. Defense Supplies Corp. v. U.S. Lines, 148 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
33. O'Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1926) ; see The Osceola, 189
U.S. 158 (1903).
34. Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Bradey v. United
States, 151 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1945) ; see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S., 135 (1950)
(a similar ruling under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
35. Mandel v. United States, 191 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1951).
36. United States v. Loyola, 161 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1947); Johnson v. U.S.,
186 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1950); Mandel v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Rodriguez v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
vessels may not. Further, such civilians on men o'war appear to be in much
the same position as customs inspectors, who clearly can collect. 37 Finally,
since all courts which have considered the matter have held that civilian
seamen can collect for wage claims under the Public Vessels Act,38 the
majority view has the considerable advantage of squaring their remedy
ex delicto with that ex contractu.
Ships to Which the Waiver of Immunity Extends.-In the language of
the Acts the waiver of immunity extends to ships "employed as merchant
vessels" 39 or which are "public vessels of the United States." 40 As such,
all ships owned by the United States but in the hands of charterers are
the subjects of liability if an action in ren would lie at private law.41 While
the possibility that a government ship will neither be "employed as a
merchant vessel" nor be a "public vessel of the United States" is remote,
42
the possibility that certain claims cognizable under the Suits in Admiralty
Act will be held not to be within the scope of the Public Vessels Act,
43
makes it important to distinguish between what is a "public vessel" and
what is a ship "employed as a merchant vessel."
Unfortunately, there has never been a case which purported to define
the term "public vessel." There has been only one which has attempted
a definition of the term "employed as a merchant vessel," and the explana-
tion there suggested is not truly satisfying.44 The real answer seems to
be that the courts have been loath to do more than decide each case on the
basis of its facts. Some of the typical fact situations are as follows: trans-
ports, whether of men, materials or civilian supplies and foodstuffs, have
been generally held to be public vessels. 45  A similar decision has been
reached in the case of training ships for the merchant marine.46 Ships in
the process of conversion from public vessels to merchantment have usually
37. United States v. Marine, 155 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1946).
38. Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Jentry v. U.S., 73
F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
39. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1946).
40. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §781 (1946).
41. The Moosabee, 7 F.2d 501 (E.D. Va. 1923); but see N.S. Byonnes and
Son Dampskibsrederi Aktieselskab v. United States, 298 Fed. 123 (S.D. N.Y.
1923).
42. For a situation in which this remote possibility came to pass, see United
States v. Caffey, judge, 141 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1944), and The Samovar, 72 F. Supp.
574 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (U.S. owned ships were being operated as public vessels of
Great Britain).
43. E.g., the Supreme Court if it ever chooses to consider the matter, moy well
hold that c6ntract claims cognizable under the Suits in Admiralty Act, will not lie
under the Public Vessels Act because not "damages caused by a public vessel."
44. Adams v. United States, 281 Fed. 895 (D. Mass. 1922). The phrase
"'employed as a merchant vessel' has reference to the work which the vessel is
doing, or for which she is proceeding, or waiting. A vessel is employed as a mer-
chant vessel not merely when transporting cargo, but when going light to load,
when awaiting repairs, etc."
45. Littlejohn and Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926) ; The Lake Lida,
290 Fed. 178 (4th Cir. 1923) ; The Impoco, 287 Fed. 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1922) ; contra,
The Jeannette Skinner, 258 Fed. 768 (D. Md. 1919).
46. The Hamburg, 298 Fed. 942 (S.D. N.Y. 1924).
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been classified as outside the scope of the Suits in Admiralty Act.47 On the
other hand, a recent wreck firmly stuck on the bottom, has been ruled to be
"employed as a merchant vessel." 4s Finally, an aged battleship grounded
for twenty-nine years in shoal water has been denied status as a public
vessel.49
The foregoing holdings appear to indicate a tendency to hold that
doubtful ships are public vessels. However, this trend is readily explained
by the fact that most of the cases were decided prior to the Public Vessels
Act, when to classify a ship as a merchant vessel was also to subject the
government to liability, a thing which the courts were not yet ready to do.
Upon the whole, the wiser rule would seem to be the opposite of the
apparent tendency. Unless a ship is clearly engaged in public pursuit it
should be held to be a merchantman. Holding that a ship is a public vessel,
with its concomitant lessening of the chances for recovery,50 can only serve
to increase the likelihood of private bills-that which the Waiver Acts were
designed to prevent.
One further word should be added. Regardless of which classification
the vessel falls into, it must be within that classification at the time the
cause of action arises 51 or, possibly, at the time the libel is filed 5 in order
to fall within the scope of the Acts.
Suits to Which the Waiver of Immunity Extends.-The development
of the Waiver Acts in the courts has been such that virtually every type and
classification of suit in admiralty is maintainable under both the Suits in
Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act. There are only two qualifica-
tions which must be made. First, the cause of action must be one cognizable
in private admiralty law. Thus, land torts such as damage done to an
underwater cable by a ship's anchor have been held to be without the scope
of the Acts on familiar admiralty principles.m This qualification, since
it has merely served to throw the suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
47. The Augusta G. Hilton, 3 F.2d 808 (D. N.J. 1925); Eastern S.S. Lines v.
United States, 187 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1951); contra, Adams v. United States, 281
Fed. 895 (D. Mass. 1922).
48. Eastern Transport Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
49. Baltimore, Crisfield and Onancook Line v. United States, 140 F.2d 230
(4th Cir. 1944); and see Durant v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. N.C.
1943) (An Italian merchant ship in the protective custody of the United States was
held to be neither public vessel nor merchantman for the purpose of the Acts).
50. As is illustrated in note 43 supra, it is possible that the Public Vessels Act
is less broad than its equivalent. Therefore, holding that a ship is a public vessel
tends to lessen the chances of recovery.
51. Shewan and Sons v. United States, 266 U.S. 108 (1924); Olavarria and
Co. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ala. 1944).
52. The Pocahontas, 278 Fed. 214 (S.D. N.Y. 1921); the Ceylon Maru, 266
Fed. 396 (D. Md. 1920); contra, The Augusta G. Hilton, 3 F.2d 808 (D. N.J.
1925).
53. Portland General Electric Co. v. United States, 142 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1944) (under the Suits in Admiralty Act) ; State of Maine v. United States, 134
F.2d 574 (1st Cir. 1943) ; United States v. South Carolina State Highway Board, 171
F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948) (A similar result under the Public Vessels Act despite
the fact that the Act extends to "damages caused by a public vessel" without specify-
ing maritime damages) ; and see Oakes v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. N.Y.
1940).
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is not to be regretted. 54 Second, the claim must in some way concern the
operation of government ships. For example, it has been held that where
the government sends cargo by a private shipper, the shipper must seek
his remedy for unpaid freight under the Tucker Act rather than the Suits
in Admiralty Act.55  Many similar holdings could be cited.56  With this
qualification, likewise, it is impossible to differ.
Apart from these two exceptions almost every possible kind of action
has been sustained as permissible. This conclusion in itself is remarkable
since, as was pointed out above,5 7 the scope of the Public Vessels Act was
thought at first to be more limited than that of the Suits in Admiralty Act,
though within what boundaries it was impossible to foretell.
It was at first argued of the Suits in Admiralty Act that it did not
extend to suits purely in personam-i.e., where no in rem liability would
have attached at private admiralty. This position gained credence from the
fact that the principal purpose of the 1920 Act had been to relieve the
government of the embarrassment of arrest. Nevertheless, the argument
was rejected in the leading case of Eastern Transport Co. v. United States r8
where suit was permitted though the res was at the bottom of the sea and
thus absolutely immune from arrest. This case proved but the first in a
long line of liberal decisions extending the scope of the Acts.
A similar latitude has been accorded to the Public Vessels Act. In
Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States 5 9 the Supreme Court, apparently
anxious to construe the Public Vessels Act with the Suits in Admiralty Act
so as "to give to private owners . . . the same right of recovery from
the government . . . which they had against each other," 60 held that the
phrase "damages caused by a public vessel" 1' extended to damages incurred
when the public vessel was not the "noxious instrument" and that the
principles of in rem liability could be used as the substantive basis of deci-
sion under the Public Vessels Act.
62
54. The Extension of Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 740 (Supp. 1951) which "sends maritime torts ashore," reverses the result in all
of the cases decided heretofore. However, it is still possible that a case may fall out-
side the scope of that Act and, in such case, the cited qualification will still apply.
55. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421 (1949).
56. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Ameri-
can President Lines v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
57. See text at notes 24-29 supra.
58. 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
59. 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
60. The language is from United States v. Caffey, judge, 141 F.2d 69, 70 (2d
Cir. 1944).
61. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1946).
62. That the principles of in rem liability could be used under the Public Vessels
Act was never in serious doubt since § 2 of the Act declares that suits under the Act
shall proceed in accordance with the provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 43
STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1946). However, in this connection it is
worth noting that in order to secure the benefit of in rem principles the libellant
must clearly elect to proceed as if in rem. There is no good reason for this holding
since the notice provisions are identical for both suits. However, the proposition
has the authority of the Second Circuit, Schnell v. United States, 166 F.2d 479 (2d
Cir. 1948).
698 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100
No serious doubt ever existed that actions under the Suits in Admiralty
Act could sound ex contractu as well as ex delicto. With the Public Vessels
Act, however, it was a different matter. Did the words "damages caused
by a public vessel" embrace damages caused by members of the crew and
contract claims? There are cases holding that actions will lie in both situa-
tions; '3 but, in the case of contract claims by a civilian member of the crew
or another, there has been some doubt. 84  As a matter of fact it is not a
great problem whether or not actions ex contractu are held to lie under the
Public Vessels Act. If they do not, there is a ready remedy under the
Tucker Act and the courts have gone so far as to treat a libel under the
Public Vessels Act as a complaint under the Tucker Act.O5 Nevertheless,
in the interests of symmetry it is to be hoped that, if the Supreme Court
ever elects to settle this conflict between circuits, the answer will be in
favor of the Public Vessels Act.
A final expansion of the Public Vessels Act has but recently occurred.
It was held in the leading case of American Stevedores v. Porello 66 that
suits under that Act could be prosecuted for personal as well as property
damage, in the particular case for injuries to a stevedore working in the hold
of a public vessel. With this decision the construction of the Public Vessels
Act has reached full flood.
A review of the foregoing leading cases could scarcely be complete
without some mention of the rationale which permitted this broad expan-
sion of the Public Vessels Act. There was considered above 67 the Con-
gressional manueverings which led to the inclusion in that Act of the
words "caused by a public vessel," and the conclusion was reached that,
while the limits of those words were not surely predictable, there were
limitations. The Supreme Court, however, has seen fit to ignore these
Congressional limitations-mainly because it was able to perceive no
rational middle ground. This conclusion is in no sense objectionable, for
the only result of another holding would have been to submit to Congress
a substantial group of meritorious claims. No one can feel sure that the
Supreme Court will continue in this liberal vein; 8 but if it does, it is
much to be applauded.
63. Roah Hook Brick, Co. v. Erie R.R., 64 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. N.Y. 1945)
(Damages caused by negligence of crew) ; and see 0. F. Nelson and Co. v. United
States, 149 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1945) (Damages to cargo caused by unseaworthi-
ness of Navy lighter acting as private carrier) ; Thomason v. United States, 184
F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1950) (Contract claim collected under Public Vessels Act);
Jentry v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (same); Prouvost
Lefebvre of Rhode Island v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 298 (D. R.I. 1945) (same).
64. Eastern S.S. Lines v. United States, 187 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1951) (Contract
claim under Public Vessels Act denied); The Everett Fowler, 151 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1945) (same).
65. The Everett Fowler, spra note 64.
66. 330 U.S. 446 (1947); See also to like effect Militano v. United States, 55
F. Supp. 904 (S.D. N.Y. 1943).
67. See text at notes 24-29 supra.
68. For example, it might well hold that contract claims are not cognizable under
the Public Vessels Act, if it ever gets around to the matter.
ADJECTIVE MATTERS AFFECTING THE SCOPE OF THE ACTS
The Acts as an Exclusive Remedy.-It has now become apparent that
the Public Vessels Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act furnish the exclu-
sive remedy to all litigants who can qualify under them 69 with certain
minor exceptions. This matter was not always so clear. It was thought by
many that although the Suits in Admiralty Act provided the sole remedy
against the United States, the Fleet Corporation could be sued at law
under the doctrine of the Sloan Shipyards Case,70 as well as under the Act.
However, this expectation was disappointed by the decision in Johnson v.
Emergency Fleet Corp., which referred to the Sloan Shipyards case as law
under the 1916 act.
71
After the general rule in favor of exclusiveness was established, three
exceptions to the rule were made out. The first arises in situations where
the United States consents to another type of suit, such a consent being
manifested by a United States original libel, or cross-libel to an improper
suit.72 The next qualification appears in situations where there is another
piece of federal legislation peculiarly adapted to handle the claim.73 The
final exception is most curious. Where, for one reason or another, the
venue provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act make it impossible in prac-
tice for the claimant to sue,74 it has been held permissible to recover under
the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims.75
69. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U.S.
202 (1927); Johnson v. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S.
320 (1930); Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352 (1932).
70. 258 U.S. 549 (1922) ; and see Fleet Corp. v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, 286
Fed. 918 (3d Cir. 1923) (a case which held Sloan Shipyards to be unimpaired.)
71. Supra note 69.
The Johnson case incidentally set off a panic among lazy litigants who were
then barred by the short two year Statute of Limitations, 41 STAT. 526 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §745 (1946), which applies to the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public
Vessels Act as well, Phalin v. U.S., 32 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1929). Eventually, the
statute of limitations had to be specially amended to preserve the rights of these
claimants, 47 STAT. 420 (1932), 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1946).
One libellant tried to argue that the Act provided the exclusive remedy solely
in cases where action in rem would have lain in private admiralty law. However,
in view of the Eastern Transport and Johnyson cases, he fared no better, United
Fruit Co. v. U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 42 F.2d 222 (D. Mass.
1930).
72. In re U. S. Steel Products Co., 24 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1928) (A private party
was allowed to file a cross libel which would have been cognizable under The
Public Vessels Act but which was barred by the staute of limitations where the U.S.
had filed the original libel) ; United States v. Australia Star, 172 F.2d 472 (2d Cir.
1949) (A British Ship need not establish reciprocity of suit, as required by the
Public Vessels Act, in order to maintain a cross libel against the United States).
73. Pullen v. Morgenthau, 73 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1934) (Transportation Act of
1920 held to cover accident involving government railroad barge) ; and see Sevin v.
Inland Waterways Corp., 88 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1937).
74. The venue provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act make it virtually im-
possible for an alien to sue upon a claim purely in personam, in the sense that no
action in rem would have been possible at private law. This matter will be con-
sidered in text at notes 93-95 infra. Such a situation is inconceivable under the
Public Vessels Act, the venue provisions of which cover every conceivable situa-
tion.
75. Angfartygsaktiebolaget Tirfing v. United States, 70 Ct. Cl. 251 (1930).
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The general rule that the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Ves-
sels Act provide the sole possible remedy, extends beyond cases in which
the United States is the nominal libellee to cases where the suit is against
a private party but the United States is the real party in interest, as where
the government will have to pay any judgment rendered against an agent
or the purchaser of one of its ships.78 At one time there was a fairly exten-
sive exception to this principle in cases where seamen were permitted to
recover against managing agents of the government under the Jones Act,
recoveries which the federal treasury would eventually have to bear; 77 but
this loop-hole has been largely closed.78  There remains a possible double
remedy only in cases where a managing agent of the government is held
liable for his torts,70 and in this situation the Courts have assumed that the
agent would not be entitled to collect over against the United States.80
The judicial determination 81 that the Suits in Admiralty Act and the
Public Vessels Act give the exclusive remedy in situations cognizable under
them is in every way a proper result. To have held that the Fleet Cor-
poration could be sued at law or that managing agents could be sued directly
under the Jones Act would have introduced an undesirable diversity into
the law. It would have meant trial by jury in some situations and not in the
remainder. It would have entailed a six year period of limitations in some
cases, a three year statute in others, and a two year limit in the rest. Thus,
it is in the interest of uniformity to have such a principle.
Jurisdictional and Venue Requirements under the Waiver Acts.-This
section is addressed to certain difficulties arising under the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act alone. The Public Vessels Act, due to the exceedingly com-
prehensive terms in which its venue provisions are cast,82 does not raise
similar problems. The first complication relates to jurisdiction under the
Suits in Admiralty Act. It was argued that since Government merchant-
men are immune from arrest only while they are in American ports,83 the
action in personam substituted for the private action in rem by § 2 84 could
only be prosecuted when the merchantman involved was within the United
76. Clyde-Mallory Lines v. The Eglantine, 317 U.S. 395 (1943).
77. Hust v. Moore-McCormick Lines, 328 U.S. 707 (1946).
78. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949) ; Fink v. Shep-
ard S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 810 (1949).
79 Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
80. Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 128 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1942).
81. Neither of the Acts in any place states that resort to its provisions shall be
the sole possible remedy.
82. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. §782 (1946) "Such suit shall be brought
in the district . . . in which the vessel . . . shall be found . . . , or if such
vessel . . . be outside . . . the United States . . . in the district . . . in which
the parties . .. suing . . . reside or have an office; or in case none of . . .
(the) . . . parties reside or have an office . . . in the United States, and . . .
(the) . . . vessel . . . be outside . . . the United States, then in any dis-
trict. . ." This language, in the estimation of the present writer, is absolutely fool-
proof and comprehensive.
83. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §741 (1946) provides that vessels of the
United States shall not be subject to arrest in the United States or its possessions.
84. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1946).
States.8 5 The United States Supreme Court, in an early decision, sustained
this view. 86 Thus it is the rule that in order to maintain a "substituted
action" in personam, the ship must be within the United States or its
possessions in order to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts. It is
not, however, necessary that the vessel be within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the District Court.8 Nor is it essential that the ship be within the
confines of the United States when the libellant is prosecuting an action
purely in personam, i.e., one which would have been in personam at private
admiralty law.88 It is a mitigating factor that the courts will construe a
libel to be purely in personam if that is fairly possible, and where it is
necessary so to construe it in order to support jurisdiction s9 but that is
small comfort to libellants with causes only in rem.
This doctrine, which compels complainants with causes of action sound-
ing only in rem to await the return of the guilty ship, ° is harsh in practice.
It has been said that jurisdiction under the Suits in Admiralty Act cannot
even be conferred by waiver. 91 The only relaxation of this stern position
is to be found in a suggestion 92 that if the ship charged with liability is
not within the country when the libel is filed but is at the time that the case
goes to trial, the defect will be cured and a second libel dispensed with.
As to venue, the Suits in Admiralty Act provides, roughly, that actions
may be brought in the district in which the libellant resides or has his
principal American place of business or in the district in which the vessel
"charged with liability" is found.98  However, it has been held that the
second alternative is only available to persons who are prosecuting actions
85. This argument has never been made under the Public Vessels Act, but it
seems doubtful that it would succeed in view of the present liberal attitudes of the
courts and the specific provision in that Act for suit when the ship is abroad. See
note 82 supra.
86. Blamberg.Bros. v. United States, 260 U.S. 452 (1923) ; and see Alsberg v.
United States, 285 Fed. 573 (S.D. N.Y. 1922).
87. Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122 (1925). It was argued that since
the United States had consented to suit only in situations where an action would be
maintainable against a private ship or shipowner and that since private action in
rem could only be prosecuted when the ship was territorially within the district
and under arrest, the same result should obtain as to the United States. This view
was accepted by many of the districts and circuits which first considered it, The
Isonomia, 285 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1922); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. United
States, 287 Fed. 751 (W.D. Wash. 1923); contra, The Anna E. Morse, 287 Fed.
364 (S.D. Ala. 1923). However, Nahmeh v. United States, mtpra, decided the issue
otherwise.
88. McGhee v. United States, 154 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1946); Cross v. United
States, 8 F.2d 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1923) ; Sportiello v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 551
(E.D. N.Y., 1944) ; Coal Operators Casualty Co. v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 236
(E.D. Pa. 1947) ; contra, Markle v. United States, 8 F.2d 87 (S.D. Tex. 1925).
89. Cross v. United States, S F.2d 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
90. And in the interim watching the short Statute of Limitations run out.
91. See Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. United States, 19 F.2d 761, 763 (2d Cir.
1927) (Dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Learned Hand). This dictum is incon-
sistent with the cases holding that where the United States has consented to be sued
otherwise, the Suits in Admiralty Act is not the exclusive remedy. See note 72 supra.
92. See Carroll v. United 'States, 133 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1943).
93. 41 STAT. 525 (1920) ; 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1946).
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which would have been in rem in private law.94 The net result of this
situation is that an alien without residence in the United States and pos-
sessed only of an action purely in personam is for all practical purposes
barred from taking advantage of the Suits in Admiralty Act.95
This state of the law has not been hard upon foreign businessmen or
corporations, for the courts have been quick to find that a mere agency
agreement with a U. S. firm amounts to a "principal place of business" in
the United States at the offices of the agents.9 8 However, it has made
things difficult for alien seamen. 97 During the Second War the situation
was saved by § a of the War Shipping Administration Clarification Act,98
which provided that alien seamen were to have all the privileges and protec-
tions accorded to native ones. This language was held to amend, or to
"force a construction of," the Suits in Admiralty Act which would permit
such sailors to sue the government. 99 However, the benefits accorded by
that Act are not permanent. Relief has been provided in some cases by
the doctrine that matters of venue, unlike matters of jurisdiction, may be
waived by express consent, by pleading to the merits or by any other familiar
process.'
00
Obviously, the narrowly conservative view which the courts have taken
in regard to jurisdiction and venue ill comports with the liberal approach
they have taken in respect to other matters arising under the waiver acts.
Nevertheless, the decisions are not apt to be overruled even by the presently
liberal Supreme Court. Therefore, the present restrictions which serve
only to multiply applications to Congress and to frustrate deserving claims,
can only be repaired by action of Congress. A provision in the Suits in
Admiralty Act similar to that in the Public Vessels Act, covering all con-
ceivable situations is greatly to be desired.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that while the Courts have sometimes been narrow and
restrictive in their construction of the waiver acts, they have more often
been liberal and progressive. It may well be asked why this diversity in
94. The Elmac, 285 Fed. 665 (S.D. N.Y. 1922), see Galban Lobo S.A. v. United
States, 18 F.2d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 1927).
95. It was a similar situation which the Court of Claims had in mind when they
decided Angfartygsaktiebolaget Tirfing v. United States, supra note 75, and held
that the Suits in Admiralty Act was not the exclusive remedy in such a situation.
96. Galban Lobo S.A. v. United States, 18 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1927).
97. Carroll v. United States, 133 "F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943); Abbott v. United
States, 61 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. N.Y. 1945). In both cases the sailors had been ac-
tually living in the United States for a couple of years; but since they were here
solely for hospital care, and in order to prosecute these suits, it was held that they
had no residence in this country.
98. 57 STAT. 45 (1943), 50 U.S.C. § 1291 (1946).
99. McGhee v. United States, 154 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1946); Metaxas v. United
States, 68 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
100. Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297 (1945) ; Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen
v. United States, 19 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1927); Rodinciue v. United States, 175 F.2d
479 (3d Cir. 1949).
approach should exist. The answer is simply that the judges have never
been able to decide whether it is better public policy to expand or contract
governmental liability. For example, in U.S. v. Shaw 10 1 the Supreme
Court said that "when authority [to sue the United States] is given, it is
liberally construed"; but only four years later the same court stated that
"the history of sovereign immunity and the practical necessity of unfettered
freedom for government from crippling interferences require a restriction
of suability to the terms of the consent, as to persons, courts, and pro-
cedure." 102 This inconsistency is understandable in view of the obvious
reluctance of the judges to impose an additional burden upon the taxpayers,
but it is submitted that this tenderness towards the public purse is mistaken.
When a litigant is denied relief in the courts by a restrictive interpretation of
a waiver statute, it will seldom save the treasury a penny. After a period
of frustration and delay, he will collect by way of private bill. The only
effect of the decision will have been to throw an additional burden upon
the legislature.
It is just this which the waiver-of-immunity acts were designed to
prevent. While seemingly never articulated with respect to the Suits in
Admiralty Act, this purpose of relieving Congress has been recognized in
the case of the Public Vessels Act 103 and clearly stated in connection with
the recent Tort Claims Act.10 4 In the light of this purpose, it is clear
that liberal interpretations are to be welcomed and restrictive holdings to
be condemned. With this in mind, it can be said that the record of the
courts in the handling of the Public Vessels Act and the Suits in Admiralty
Act is more covered with honor than dishonor.
John Grier Bartol, Jr.
A CRITIQUE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
Grubb, plaintiff, contracted in writing to buy a farm from Rockey,
defendant, "for the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars," and having
paid it, sued for specific performance. Defendant introduced evidence that
there was a contemporaneous oral agreement, denied by plaintiff, that the
real purchase price was $11,200, but that the plaintiff requested that the
writing read $10,000 so that he could prevent his family from knowing he
had bought the farm for over $10,000. The chancellor found that the actual
purchase price was orally agreed upon at $11,200 as defendant contended,
101. 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940) ; and see Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122
(1925).
102. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944); and see
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
103. New England Maritime Co. v. United States, 55 F.2d 674 (D. Mass. 1932).
104. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) ; United States v. South Caro-
lina Highway Dept., 171 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948).
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and refused specific performance. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed on the ground that the "modern Pennsylvania Parol Evidence
Rule" should have excluded defendant's evidence of the oral agreement
which contradicted the written instrument, and directed that a decree be
entered for plaintiff.'
Defendant's story, though denied, was plausible and his evidence
persuaded the chancellor. The determination of fact was made, not by a lay
jury, but rather by a judge specially trained through experience to detect
lies and inaccuracies. Yet, on appeal, the existence of this oral agreement
was held to be immaterial because the parties had executed a writing which
would have been contradicted by the oral agreement. Thus, the contractual
relationship of the parties was controlled by the terms of a writing although
one party had proved that neither had assented to it as embodying the terms
of their agreement. Other cases have been so decided in Pennsylvania, and,
in a great many more, judgment is given on the pleadings because the allega-
tion of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement which would in any way
alter the legal effect of the writing is deemed an insufficient basis for a cause
of action or defense.
Such artificiality does not on its face comport with any concept of an
enlightened jurisprudence. Hence the inquiry is always pertinent whether
it is the product of business necessity and, if so, whether it has been confined
to the minimum required by its source. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the operation of the parol evidence rule in Pennsylvania from this
viewpoint.
The parol evidence rule as usually stated by the text writers is sub-
stantially as follows: if the parties to a contract have intended to embody
all of its terms in the form of a writing, i.e., have integrated 2 it, no parol 3
evidence of antecedent agreements may be admitted to vary, add to, con-
tradict, or in any way alter the written terms.4 The merit of the rule so
stated in incontestable. If the parties have in fact intended the writing to
be the complete embodiment of their agreement, evidence of antecedent
agreements is irrelevant except for purposes of interpretation. It can make
1. Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951).
2. "An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writ-
ings as the final and complete expression of the agreement. An integration is the
writing or writings so adopted." RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS'§ 228 (1932).
3. The choice of the word "parol" was, indeed, unfortunate, for when used with
reference to the parol evidence rule, it is not limited to oral evidence as the word
implies, but to all extrinsic evidence, be it oral or written. 9 WIGOmRE, EVIrENCE
5 (3d ed. 1940); 3 CoRBiN, CONTRAcTs 215 (1951). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has said that "the word parol is used to distinguish contracts which are made
verbally, or in writing not under seal, from those which are under seal." Kime v.
Tobyhanna Creek Ice Co., 240 Pa. 61, 64, 87 Atl. 278 (1913) (italics supplied).
4. 3 CoRaNn, op. cit. supra note 3, at 215; RESTATEMENT, CoNnRAcrs § 237
(1932). Wigmore has phrased it, "When a jural act is embodied in a single
memorial, all other utterances on that topic are legally immaterial for the purposes
of determining what are the terms of their act." 9 WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 76. Another phrasing, the source of much confusion, is "Parol evidence is in-
admissible to vary, contradict, or add to terms of a written instrument." McCormick,
The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41
YAm L.J. 365, 369 (1932).
no difference what the terms of the agreement of yesterday were if the
parties decide today, as they have a perfect right to do,5 that the agree-
ment of today is to supersede and nullify that of yesterday.6 In such terms,
the "rule" appears as no more than an over-complicated way of saying that
the parties can prove their contract. Special nomenclature would be mis-
leading then to the extent it implies any difference from the usual proof of
contract. Such simplicity, juxtaposed with the common "understanding"
in the professional lore that there is something special about the situation
where an attempt is made to vary a writing, gives pointed warning of a sub-
stantial difference between the premise and its application. The point-of-
departure is in assigning meaning to its terms.
It is generally agreed that the essence of integration is the intent of
the parties, but there is disagreement as to what is meant by the concept
"intent." Some authorities contend that it is the actual intent of these par-
ties which is to be considered, and this, of course, would necessitate ad-
mitting all otherwise admissible relevant evidence of the circumstances
preceding and surrounding the transaction.7 On the other hand, it is con-
tended that the consideration of evidence should be restricted to a com-
parison of the written and alleged oral agreements.8 This limitation on the
admissibility of evidence makes apparent that it is not the actual intent that
is sought, because actual intent may be determined only by considering all
of the evidence. The intent here sought is that which it appears probable
any parties who would have executed this written contract in such circum-
stances would have had regarding the asserted oral agreement. The key
difference is between an objective, probable intent and an actual, personal
intent.
Because of the divergence among the standard texts (and the possible
inconsistency within some of them), a meaningful appreciation of the prac-
tical significance of the parol evidence rule can be gained only by examining
5. "Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or modified by
subsequent agreement of the parties." 3 CoRB N, op. cit. sapra note 3, at 222. See
§ 574, generally.
6. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that the parol evidence rule has no appli-
cation to subsequent agreements. Obviously, the parties could not have intended
the writing to embody a future agreement that was non-existent when the writing
was executed.
"It is always competent for the parties to a written instrument to show that
it was subsequently abandoned in whole or in part, modified, changed, or a new one
substituted. And this may be shown by parol, by showing either an express agree-
ment, or actions necessarily involving the alteration." Holloway v. Frick, 149 Pa.
178, 180 (1892). See, e.g., Weldon & Kelly Co. v. Pavia Co., 354 Pa. 75, 79, 46
A.2d 466, 468 (1946) ; Shaffer v. Scharding, 348 Pa. 423, 424, 35 A.2d 270 (1944) ;
Mazer v. Kann, 343 Pa. 376, 379, 22 A.2d 707, 708 (1941); Magazine D. Pub. Co.
v. Shade, 330 Pa. 487, 492, 199 AtI. 190, 193 (1938). But cf. Crew Levick Co.
v. Phila. Investment B. & L. Assn., 117 Pa. Super. 397, 177 Atl. 498 (1935).
7. "This intent [to integrate] must be sought where always intent must be
sought . . . namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances (italics in the original). The document alone will not szaflce." (italics
supplied). 9 WmGORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98. To the same effect, 3 CORMIN,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 216.
8. 3 WIULISTON, CoNTRACTs § 633 (rev. ed. 1939). See RESTATEmENT, CON-
TRACTS § 228-244 (1932).
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its application in a particular jurisdiction. A case-analysis of the Penn-
sylvania law provides the subject matter here.
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Gianni v. Russell & Co.Q-The statement of the parol evidence rule
most frequently found in Pennsylvania opinions is: "Where parties, with-
out any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writ-
ing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only, evi-
dence of their agreement." 10 The famous case of Gianni v. Russell & Co."
in 1924 marks the beginning of the history of the "modern Parol Evidence
Rule" in Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff, apparently an illiterate, executed a written lease for a room
in defendant's office building to be used "only for the sale of fruit, candy,
soda water, etc." Plaintiff alleged that, although the lease was silent upon
the point, defendant orally promised during their negotiations to give plain-
tiff the exclusive right to sell soft drinks, and in breach of this agreement
subsequently leased part of the building to a drug store company without
restricting its right to sell soda water. Defendant's objection to plaintiff's
introduction of this evidence was overruled, and judgment was entered for
plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, entered judgment for defendant,
and announced the doctrine which dominated all subsequent attempts in
Pennsylvania to vary, contradict, or alter written instruments. Almost
without exception, modern Pennsylvania cases concerning the parol evi-
dence rule cite Gianni as controlling authority.
The court said first, "The writing must be the entire contract between
the parties if the parol evidence is to be excluded." This necessitated dis-
covering whether the writing was the whole agreement. The standard
upon which this determination was made was that "the writing will be
looked at and if it appears to be a contract complete within itself 'couched
in such terms as import a complete legal obligation without any uncertainty
as to the object or extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that
the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of their
undertaking, were reduced to writing.'" 12
A second test 18 was then applied to decide whether the writing, com-
plete on its face, had merged within it the alleged oral agreement. This
9. 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).
10. E.g., Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 598, 63 A.2d 9, 10 (1949) ; Barnsley
v. Shaffer, 358 Pa. 415, 418, 57 A.2d 870, 871 (1948) ; Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281
Pa. 320, 323, 126 Atl. 791, 792 (1924).
11. For an anlysis of the law before 1924, see Harrison, Pennsylvania Rule as
to Admissibility of Eidence to Establish Contemporaneous Inducing Promises to
Affect Written Instruments, 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 235, 236 (1926). See also Note,
83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 500 (1935).
12. Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 323, 126 Atl. 791, 792 (1924).
13. While it is not completely clear whether the text of the opinion immediately
following the above quotation was meant to be a second test, or only another factor
in determining whether an instrument is complete on its face, it is believed that the
former is the sounder position and was the court's intention. The case is herein
analyzed on that assumption which subsequent cases indicate to be correct.
determination was made "by comparing the two, and determining whether
parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally and
normally include the one in the other if it were made." 14 In order to deter-
mine what would have been natural and normal, the court looked at the
two agreements to determine whether they "relate to the same subject
matter, and are so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time,
and in the same contract," and since they were, "the scope of the subsidiary
agreement must be taken to be covered by the writing." 15 Finding that
the right to sell "soda water" was the "'subject matter" of the oral agree-
ment, and was specifically mentioned in the written agreement, the court
decided that the writing should control despite the fact that it had been
decided in the trial court, after all of the evidence was considered, that the
oral agreement not only had been made, but was actually intended to be
binding. In reversing the trial judge, the Supreme Court made it quite
clear that it was not concerned with what was natural and normal for these
particular parties, but rather for parties generally who might have executed
this contract.
Application of Gianni v. Russell & Co.-Little need be said regarding
the application of the first test which concerns determining whether a
writing is complete. The courts are extremely prone to find the writing
complete on its face. This is particularly true of formal instruments such
as leases,16 deeds,17 mortgages,'8 and elaborately drawn contracts,19 but
is by no means limited to this sort of instrument. An order form,
20 letter,21
and even a negotiable instrument 22 can be "complete on its face." 2 But
14. Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 324, 126 Atl. 791, 792 (1924).
15. Ibid.
16. Priestman-Helmetag Co. v. Wolf, 317 Pa. 346, 177 At. 30 (1935); Murphy
v. Pinney, 86 Pa. Super. 458 (1926). Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126
Ati. 791 (1924) itself involved a lease.
17. Nallin-Jennings Park Co. v. Sterling, 364 Pa. 611, 73 A.2d 390 (1950);
Goldsmith v. Means, 104 Pa. Super. 571, 158 AtI. 596 (1931).
18. Penna. Co. v. Lebanon B. & L. Assn., 337 Pa. 316, 10 A.2d 418 (1940);
P.-P. Trust Co. v. Dunn Home Site Co., 311 Pa. 315, 166 AtI. 844 (1933).
19. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 66 A.2d 309 (1949) (agreement to dissolve
a partnership); Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 63 A.2d 9 (1949) (contract to
operate a strip mining lease) ; First Nat. Bk. of Scranton v. Payne, 349 Pa. 446,
37 A.2d 568 (1944) (agreement to sell stock) ; Germantown T. Co. v. Emhardt, 321
Pa 561, 184 Adt. 457 (1936) (guaranty of bond and mortgage).
20. Atlas Bolt & Screw Co. v. Komins, 138 Pa. Super. 474, 10 A.2d 871 (1939).
21. Jordan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 366 Pa. 495, 77 A.2d 631
(1951). But cf. Garrison v. Salkind, 285 Pa. 265, 132 At. 125 (1926).
22. Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, 154 Atl. 127 (1931) (leading case); Nat.
Bk. of Fayette Co. v. Valentich, 343 Pa. 132, 22 A.2d 724 (1941); Lycoming Trust
Co. v. Smithgall, 334 Pa. 4, 5 A.2d 152 (1939) ; Architectural Tile Co. v. McSorley,
311 Pa. 299, 166 AtI. 913 (1933).
23. In Constructors' Assn. of Western Penna. v. Furman, 165 Pa. Super. 248,
67 A.2d 590 (1949), an application for membership in a fraternal organization was
held complete within itself.
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where there has been a palpable omission, 2 4 or an express reference to an-
other agreement,25 the writing is deemed not complete within itself.26 Parol
evidence is said to be admissible to explain an ambiguity, and it may be
plausibly contended that an ambiguous writing is not complete, but the
courts do not so hold.27 Instead, admitting evidence to resolve an ambiguity
is considered not to be varying or contradicting the terms of a writing
complete on its face, but rather explaining them.
28
A more extended discussion is warranted with respect to the applica-
tion of the second test which concerns what is natural and normal. Some
cases adopt the "subject matter" criterion of Gianni v. Russell & Co.
Thus, where consideration of a stated sum of money was mentioned in a
written contract for the sale of land, evidence to show that a greater sum
was orally promised was inadmissible; 29 the assignee of two non-negotiable
promissory notes was not permitted to show defendant had orally promised
to endorse and guaranty payment of them;S ° and where plaintiff had sold
his share of a partnership to defendant, and sued to recover the promised
consideration, defendant could not introduce evidence to prove his counter-
claim that plaintiff had breached an oral contemporaneous promise not
to engage in a competing business.8 1
In a few cases, the court, ignoring the "subject matter" criterion, found
that the alleged oral agreement would have been naturally and normally
included within the written because it vitally affected the legal effect of the
24. Swartz v. Hafer, 354 Pa. 320, 47 A.2d 224 (1946) (date omitted);
Iacovino v. Caterino, 332 Pa. 556, 2 A.2d 828 (1938) (amount of debt omitted);
Goldstein v. Penny, 328 Pa. 78, 195 At. 27 (1937) (The writing read "for and
in consideration of the sum of one and no/100 ($1.00) Dollars, and other good and
valuable considerations. . . .") ; Moyer v. Heilveil, 159 Pa. Super. 610, 49 A.2d
514 (1946) (term of employment omitted from employment contract).
25. C. D. Brown & Co. v. Stand. H. Co., 301 Pa. 543, 152 Atl. 557 (1930)
(reference to a prior offer and resulting telephone conversation) ; Specker v. Sun
Ray Drug Co., 163 Pa. Super. 39, 60 A.2d 400 (1948) (writing referred to "exist-
ing privileges.").
26. But cf. Ruck v. Vassalotti, 152 Pa. Super. 188, 31 A.2d 596 (1943) ; Blair's
Estate v. Appliance Service Co., 141 Pa. Super. 508, 15 A.2d 520 (1940); Bole v.
Alden Park Manor, 98 Pa. Super. 65 (1929); these cases hold that the writings
in question were not complete on their respective faces and are rare examples of
the courts' straining to avoid the obvious injustice of the Pennsylvania rule.
27. "The writing was the entire agreement between the parties. But the lower
court was clearly wrong in holding as a matter of law that the assignment of
'Delinquent Registrations' complied with defendant's allegation under the contract.
The intent of the parties as to what kind of 'O.P.A. rent registrations' defendant
was bound to deliver, was a question for the jury." Cirotti v. Wassell, 163 Pa.
Super. 292, 295, 60 A.2d 339, 340 (1948).
28. See text at note 72 infra.
29. Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951) (reversing trial judge).
See text at note 1 supra.
30. First Nat. Bk. of Scranton v. Payne, 349 Pa. 446, 37 A.2d 568 (1944) (de-
cided on the pleadings).
31. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 66 A.2d 309 (1949) (decided on the
pleadings) ; see also Barnsley v. Shaffer, 358 Pa. 415, 57 A.2d 870 (1948) ; Interna-
tional Fuel Serv. Corp. v. Steams, 304 Pa. 157, 155 Atl. 285 (1931) ; Colonial Mfg.
Co. v. Carideo, 142 Pa. Super. 485, 16 A.2d 731 (1940). See also Nelly v. Diskin,
113 Pa. Super. 249, 173 At. 735 (1934). Chanin v. J. B. Liebman & Co., 341
Pa. 552, 20 A.2d 208 (1941) may also fit into this category.
written instrument. The buyer of real estate under a written agreement
of sale could not show that seller orally agreed to construct dwelling houses
on said land; 32 and a buyer of stock for $38,000, which sum was to be paid
in installments secured by the stock and other property, could not show an
oral contemporaneous agreement that he was not to be personally liable,
and that only the security was to be looked to for payment.33
In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, the court merely
expresses a blanket prohibition against the introduction of evidence to alter,
vary, or contradict a written instrument 3 4 One recent case refers to
"hornbook" law.3 5 It is probable that the court has tacitly decided in these
cases that the two tests of Gianni v. Russell & Co. have been satisfied.
It is really unimportant which of these articulations the court makes
because the results almost invariably are the same: no outside evidence may
be admitted to undermine the "integrity of written instruments." 3 6 There
are few cases which hold it to be natural or normal for the written agree-
ment not to have included the oral.37  The extreme position of the Penn-
sylvania courts may be illustrated by their treatment of cases in which one
party to a sale governed by the Sales Act attempts to assert an express
32. Home B. & S. Co. v. Ruthrauff, 295 Pa. 237, 145 Atl. 129 (1929) (ob-
jection to offer of proof sustained).
33. Myers v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 249, 155 Atl. 563 (1931) (reversing trial
judge).
"It could not be properly or justly concluded that they left this most im-
portant feature of the agreement out to be read into it by inference." Dahath
Electric Co. v. Suburban Electric D. Co., 332 Pa. 129, 133, 2 A.2d 765, 767
(1938) (involving an attempt to show that a distributing agency was to be
exclusive).
See also C.I.T. Corp. v. Grosick, 110 Pa. Super. 165, 172, 167 Atl. 440,
442 (1933) and Hoesch v. Freedman, 109 Pa. Super. 503, 167 Atl. 256 (1933);
Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579, 136 Atl. 847 (1927) (decided on the plead-
ings).
34. E.., Schar v. Maier, 355 Pa. 153, 49 A2d 387 (1946); Smith v.
Commonwealth, 351 Pa. 68, 40 A.2d 383 (1945); Penna. Co. v. Lebanon B. & L.
Assn., 337 Pa. 316, 10 A.2d 418, (1940); Lycoming Trust Co. v. Smithgall, 334
Pa. 4, 5 A.2d 152 (1939); Richards v. Integrity Trust Co., 317 Pa. 513, 177 Atl.
28 (1935) ; Waber's Estate, 317 Pa. 497, 177 Atl. 51 (1935) ; Priestman-Helmetag
Co. v. Wolf, 317 Pa. 346, 117 Atl. 30 (1935); Home B. & S. Co. v. Ruthrauff,
295 Pa. 237, 145 At. 129 (1929); Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 167 Pa. Super. 368, 75
A.2d 13 (1950); Yorkshire Worsted Mills v. Braman, 115 Pa. Super. 333, 175
Atl. 726 (1934).
35. Molloy v. Brown, 364 Pa. 92, 70 A.2d 336 (1950).
"This is nothing but an attempt by defendants to alter, by parol evidence, a
subsequent written agreement with respect to three natters fully and specifically
covered at length in the written agreement. Such an attempt, in view of our re-
cent decisions on this subject is astonishing." (italics in original). T. W. Phillips
Gas & Oil Co. v. Kline, 368 Pa. 516, 519, 84 A.2d 301, 302 (1951).
36. See note 83, supra, and text.
37. Ferita v. Farrise, 360 Pa. 382, 61 A.2d 836 (1948) (written contract to sell
realty did not specify what part of the entire contract price each of two vendees
was to contribute) ; Russo's Estate, 119 Pa. Super. 309, 180 Atl. 741 (1935) (writ-
ten ante-nuptial agreement did not include oral agreement to satisfy a mortgage);
Kisinger v. Pa. Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 119 Pa. Super. 16, 180 Atl. 79 (1935)
(written agreement to extend a mortgage did not include the consideration therefor
or a promise of set off).
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warranty.38 The Act provides: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise
by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase
the goods and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. . . ." 9
Except for the statute of frauds,40 no statutory distinction is drawn be-
tween written and oral contracts; there is not even a hint in the direction
of any parol evidence rule. The main purpose of the express warranty
provision is to prevent a seller from taking advantage of an unwary buyer
for whom a tort remedy of deceit is inadequate because of the necessity of
proving scienter.41  And yet, by consistently holding that the parol evi-
dence rule excludes evidence of oral express warranties, 42 the Pennsylvania
courts have fairly well neutralized the effect of this provision of the Sales
Act so far as oral warranties are concerned.
43
Jural Acts and Conditions Precedent.-Since the parol evidence rule
does not purport to exclude any evidence until the existence of a contract
has been established, it is commonly accepted that parol evidence is ad-
missible to show that there was in fact no contract between the parties, or,
to use Wigmore's phrase, that there was no "jural act." 4 Thus, parol
evidence is admissible in Pennsylvania to show that there has been no de-
livery of a written instrument even though there has been a physical
transfer.45 Consideration of this evidence is vital since delivery depends
38. "There is no more frequent application of the parol evidence rule than cases
where it is sought to attach a parol warranty to a written contract to sell goods."
1 WiLLisToN, SALES § 215 (2d ed. 1924). Surprisingly, relatively few cases on war-
ranties have been decided in Pennsylvania since 1924.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 121 (Purdon, 1931). The section continues,
. no affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a
statement of the seller's opinion only, shall be construed as a warranty."
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 42 (Purdon, 1931).
41. PRossER, TORTS §§72-74 (1941).
42. Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price B. Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 At. 377 (1933)
(alternate holding that the statement was opinion) ; Hill & MacMillan, Inc. v. Taylor,
304 Pa. 18, 155 Atl. 103 (1931); Lake Erie Seed Co. v. Edwards, 86 Pa. Super.
103 (1926) (alternate holding that the statement was opinion) ; Metropolitan Sewing
Machine Co. v. Senderowitz, 11 Leh. L.J. 341 (1925); Koll v. Gen. Motors Truck
Co., 311 Pa. 580, 586, 166 Atl. 562, 563 (1933) (dictum).
In Michelin Tire Co. v. Shulz, 295 Pa. 140, 145 Atl. 67 (1929), a counterclaim
for breach of an oral warranty was dismissed solely on ground that the statement
was opinion, and no reference to the parol evidence rule was made, but the court later
said in Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price B. Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 27, 166 Atl. 377, 378,
379 (1933), that it must now be read in conjunction with Gianni v. Russell & Co.,
281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).
43. Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Rodziewicz, 125 Pa. Super. 240, 189 Atl. 580 (1937)
and The White Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. 315 (1928), hold that the parol
evidence rule has no application to implied warranties, since they arise by opera-
tion of law, and were beyond the contemplation of the parties. This reason-
ing appears equally valid to permit the showing of an oral express warranty arising
from an affirutation of fact, since this warranty also arises by operation of law re-
gardless of intent. 1 WHIUsTON, op. cit. .npra note 38, § 215.
44. 9 WiGmom, op. cit. mfpra note 3, §§ 2404-2423; 3 WiLsToN, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 1822-1827; 3 CoREiN, op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 231-241.
45. Eaton v. N.Y. Life Ins.. Co. of N.Y., 315 Pa. 68, 172 At. 121 (1934);
accord, Stiegelman v. Ackman, 351 Pa. 592, 41 A.2d 679 (1945) ; Devall v. Glover,
250 Pa. 417, 95 Atl. 561 (1915).
upon the transferor's intent, and the Pennsylvania courts here concede that
it is impossible to ascertain the intent from the physical transfer alone.4"
But, they limit the admission of the evidence to the delivery cases. Evi-
dence is not admissible to show that both parties intended that no liability
was to attach from the signing of the ostensible agreement; instead, only
the agreements will be considered.
In Third N.B. & T. Co., Scranton v. Rodgers,4 7 plaintiff, payee of
a promissory note, sued defendant, maker, who admitted execution of the
note, but contended that the president of plaintiff company orally promised
him that he would not be liable upon it, and that the plaintiff would look
solely to an endorser for payment. The Supreme Court affirmed judgment
on a directed verdict for plaintiff, and held, on authority of Gianni and other
cases, that ". . . a person who executed and delivers a written obligation
may not thereafter escape responsibility by averring it was not intended
that he was to be held liable thereon." 48 This case and others like it 49
are basically inconsistent with the closely analogous delivery cases. In both,
the parties have acted in a manner which would usually signify a mutual
intent to create new legal relations. If they executed a writing, a party in
one may be prevented from demonstrating that there was no actual intent
to be bound, and the apparent intent ascertained from the agreements alone
will be controlling. But if they have transferred physical possession of the
instrument, a party in the other may still show the actual intent of the
parties was not to be bound, and the apparent intent will not be deter-
minative.
A related and possibly overlapping type of case involves the attempt
to show the existence of a condition precedent orally agreed upon which did
not in fact occur. In the rare case where the condition goes to the very
existence of the contract (once more, the jural act), it is again commonly
accepted that parol evidence to show its existence and non-fulfillment is
admissible.50 But, even this axiom was recently repudiated by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court. Plaintiff and defendant executed a writing which
provided plaintiff was to make repairs on the heating systems of two build-
ings owned by defendant. When defendant refused to permit plaintiff to
make the prescribed repairs, plaintiff sued for the loss of profits. Defend-
46. "Whether or not there was a legally effective delivery of this policy, i.e.,
a final jural act, depends on whether or not the minds of the agent and the insured
met on the matter of the finality of the delivery. Did the agent and the insured
intend the former's manual delivery of the policy to the latter, to be an absolute de-
livery and acceptance? The answer to this is to be found not only in what was
done but in what was said. What was merely done being not conclusive of the
issue, what words accompanied the deeds of the manual delivery and acceptance, re-
spectively, become important. These deeds imaccompanied by words would indicate
an absolute delivery and acceptance. If there were accompanying words, these
iniqht show that the delivery and acceptance were only conditional. . . ." Eaton
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 315 Pa. 68, 78, 172 At. 121, 125 (1934).
47. 330 Pa. 523, 198 Atl. 320 (1938).
48. Id. at 525, 198 Atl. at 321.
49. Myers v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 249, 155 AtI. 563 (1931) ; United States Nat. Bk.
v. Evans, 296 Pa. 541, 146 AtI. 126 (1929).
50. See note 44 infra.
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ant asserted in his pleadings an oral contemporaneous agreement that the
paper was not intended to constitute a contract until defendant and his son
had further perused plaintiff's offer. The trial judge sustained plaintiff's
objection to the defendant's offer of proof, and charged the jury that a bind-
ing contract had been entered into as a matter of law. Judgment for plain-
tiff was affirmed by the Superior Court 51 on authority of Gianni v. Russell
& Co. and other cases.
More frequently, the asserted oral condition is not precedent to the
existence of a contract, but rather to liability under a valid contract. Until
1947, the Pennsylvania courts did not distinguish between conditions prec-
edent. and other types of contractual terms, and consistently held that the
parol evidence rule applied.52 A different view was announced in Smilow
v. Dickerson. 3  Defendant employed plaintiff's decedent under a written
contract. As part of the consideration, defendant promised to satisfy a
$10,000 debt owed by plaintiff's decedent to a third party but, to avoid
income tax consequences, the parties agreed to set up on defendant's books
a fictitious expense payment of $10,000. Since they recognized the possible
illegality of the scheme, they orally conditioned it upon approval of defend-
ant's tax lawyer. Plaintiff's decedent was killed before the tax lawyer
could examine the writing. When plaintiff sued for an accounting under
the terms of the writing, defendant proved the oral condition. The lower
court held the evidence to be admissible and dismissed plaintiff's bill. The
Supreme Court, Justice Horace Stern concurring and Chief Justice Drew
vigorously dissenting, affirmed on authority of a delivery case,5 4 and stated
that "The parol evidence rule has no application where parol testimony
reveals the instrument never had any legal existence or binding force." 5
Argument with the court's analysis might be made since there was a valid
contract in existence, but liability was conditioned upon a future oc-
currence.55 This conceptual criticism, however, is relatively unimportant
51. McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Super. 1, 82 A.2d 70 (1951).
52. Architectural Tile Co. v. McSorley, 311 Pa. 299, 166 Atl. 913 (1933)
Title Holding Co. v. Black, 306 Pa. 352, 159 Atl. 560 (1932) ; Hembleton v. Hart-
man, 160 Pa. Super. 447, 51 A.2d 511 (1947).
"Any parol agreement that subjects the obligation on the instrument to any
condition or contingency, whether in person, time or amount, is ineffective, and the
instrument is unconditional, unless fraud, accident, or mistake was the means through
which the instrument was procured." Speier v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, 72, 154 Atl.
127, 128 (1931).
53. 357 Pa. 455, 54 A.2d 883 (1947).
54. Eaton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 315 Pa. 68, 172 Ad. 121 (1934).
55. Id at 461, 54 A2d at 886.
56. "In making an analysis of a specific case, we should ask the following ques-
tions: (1) Was the transaction revocable? (2) In order to 'make' a contract was
a new expression of assent necessary? (3) If the event, orally stated as a condi-
tion, occurred would the agreement be enforceable despite supervening deaths and
revocations?" 3 CoaI N, op. cit. supra note 3, at 329.
Here, questibns (1) and (2) would be answered "no," and question (3) an-
swered "yes." It will be noted that in McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Super. 1,
82 A.2d 70 (1951), discussed in the text preceding note 51 supra, the defendant
himself had the power to further peruse the document. The answer to questions
(1) and (2) would be "yes," and to (3) "no." There was therefore no contract in
the latter case.
since the practical result of both approaches is the introduction of the
evidence.
This case could have been construed as the first step away from the
long established rule which makes actual intent immaterial, but all indica-
tions are that it will not be so read. A subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning a condition precedent omitted any reference to the Smilow
case, and instead granted summary judgment on authority of Gianni; 7 a
recent Superior Court decision has distinguished Smilow in that it was
"decided on the basis of [its] own peculiar facts and [does] not control
the present" case.58 Smitow probably will be distinguished in the future
on the grounds that the contract therein was illegal and, as was held in a
case involving usury,59 the parol evidence rule does not prevent showing the
contract to be illegal.
Fraud, Accident and Mistake.-The policies underlying the parol evi-
dence rule are said to be the preservation of the integrity of written instru-
ments 60 and the prevention of perjury.61 These factors are present in any
case where an attempt is made to alter, vary, or contradict a written in-
strument. But it is recognized in Pennsylvania that the parol evidence rule
does not exclude evidence of fraud, accident, or mistake.62 In such cases
the courts are aware that the aforementioned policies are subservient to the
other policies of not binding parties to a writing the terms of which do not
represent their intent, and not permitting the evil doer to benefit by his own
wrongdoing. An extended discussion of the substantive law in these fields
would be beyond the scope of this note. It is only the manner in which the
law affects the operation of the parol evidence rule that is here germane.
A liberal and discretionary use of the labels fraud, accident or mistake
could do much to alleviate hardships which might result from a strict ap-
plication of the Pennsylvania parol evidence rule. One might think a judge
could fit the facts of a particular case into one of these categories if he felt
justice so demanded. An analysis of the cases quickly disposes of any
such hope. Fraud, accident and mistake are decidedly not used as judicial
tools to circumvent the parol evidence rule when the "justice" of a par-
ticular case gives a strong stimulus for circumvention.
"Accident" may be summarily dismissed. Despite innumerable cases
which state that accident may always be shown, no case has been found that,
even by way of dictum, discusses what is meant by the term, let alone
holds directly that the facts of the case constitute an accident.
"It has been more than once held that it is error to submit a question
of fraud to the jury upon slight parol evidence to overturn a written instru-
57. Waldman v. Shoemaker, 367 Pa. 587, 80 A.2d 776 (1951).
58. McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Super. 1, 6, 82 A.2d 70, 72 (1951) dis-
cussed in text preceding note 51 supra.
59. Simpson v. Penn Discount Corp., 335 Pa. 172, 5 A.2d 796 (1939).
60. See note 83 infra.
61. See note 87 infra.
62. Virtually every parol evidence rule case since and including Gianni v. Rus-
sell & Co. may be cited as at least dictum for this statement.
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ment. The evidence of fraud must be clear, precise and indubitable; other-
wise it should be withdrawn from the jury." '1 This quotation seems to
sum up the Pennsylvania law accurately.6 4  The cases are rare in which
fraud has been found,e5 and cases which have held that mere failure to
keep a promise is not fraud destroy any possibility that "fraud" might be
flexible.6 6 While it might be tlought that a general allegation of fraud could
avoid judgment on the pleadings and permit the introduction of evidence
at trial, this is so only if the facts by which the allegation is to be proved
are also averred.
6 7
It is likewise unusual for relief to be granted for mistake, because,
once more, the evidence must be clear, precise and indubitable. 8 The
63. Aliquippa Nat. Bk. v. Harvey, 340 Pa. 223, 231, 16 A.2d 409, 414 (1940).
It was said in Schmitt v. William G. Johnston Co., 136 Pa. Super. 213, 219,
7 A.2d 131, 133-134 (1939) quoting from Thompson v. Schoch, 254 Pa. 585, 99
Atl. 72 (1916): ". . . [I]n order to sustain such a defense [fraud], the evidence
relied upon, taken as a whole, must be so persuasive in character, so free from self-
contradiction or material internal variances, and so intrinsically probable, that the
judicial mind can rest thereon with a conviction that the ends of justice would be
served by giving it effect as the basis of a decree reforming the writing in suit. That
is to say, the witnesses in support of the alleged contemporaneous parol contract
must be credible and their examination must show them to have a distinct recollec-
tion of the relevant material facts; and, in so far as their evidence must be
mutually corroborative, they should, to a reasonable degree, show a common un-
derstanding of the particular matter in question. In brief, their testimony must be
clear, precise and indubitable before it can be permitted. .. ."
64. Independent Coat Co. v. Michalowski, 349 Pa. 349, 37 A.2d 518 (1944);
Schoble v. Schoble, 349 Pa. 408, 37 A.2d 604 (1944); Foley v. Wasserman, 319
Pa. 420, 179 AUt. 595 (1935).
65. LaCourse v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951); Hollowell's Estate,
120 Pa. Super. 576, 182 Atl. 779 (1936).
"A consideration of the sequence of events here shows a high-pressure salesman
swooping down upon two retiring and unsophisticated folk and by dangling promises
of easy gains before their eyes charming them into prompt and unresisting com-
pliance with his wishes. Unknown to them as he was, he called at their home un-
announced and without an introduction by any mutual friend, and within about 48
hours, had possessed himself of two of their mortgages upon improved real estate
in exchange for title to five unimproved so-called building lots. Even so, plaintiffs
cannot escape from the bad bargain which they made, unless by evidence, they have
brought themselves within the principles of law which invalidate a transaction such
as this because of fraudulent representations." Zettlemoyer v. Bloch, 329 Pa. 205,
207, 198 Atl. 80 (1934).
66. Fidurski v. Hammill, 328 Pa. 1, 195 Atl. 3 (1937) (action in trespass for
deceit, and no discussion of the parol evidence rule); United States Nat. Bk. v.
Evans, 296 Pa. 541, 146 Atl. 126 (1929) ; Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Garland, 291
Pa. 297, 139 AtI. 876 (1927) ; Emanuel v. Hughes, 295 Pa. 492, 145 AUt. 586 (1929).
67. Hambleton v. Hartman, 160 Pa. Super. 447, 51 A.2d 511 (1947); Silberman
v. Crane, 158 Pa. Super. 186, 44 A.2d 598 (1945); Colonial Mfg. Co. v. Carideo,
142 Pa. Super. 485, 16 A.2d 731 (1940) ; T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Kline, 368
Pa. 516, 84 A.2d 301 (1951).
Nor can judgment on the pleadings be avoided by a naked averment that the oral
agreement was subsequent to the written. Priestman-Helmetag Co. v. Wolf, 317
Pa. 346, 177 Atl. 30 (1935).
68. Weightman v. Weightman, 342 Pa. 8, 10, 20 A.2d 215, 217 (1941) ; Berardini"
v. Kay, 326 Pa. 481, 488, 192 Atl. 882, 885 (1937) ; Bosler v. Sun Oil Co., 325 Pa.
411, 420, 190 Atl. 718, 721 (1937).
mistake must be such that would warrant a court of equity to reform or
rescind the contract. Failure to read the writing when the ability and
opportunity to do so existed is not deemed sufficient,69 unless the other party
knew that the writing did not embody the terms of the agreement: ° In
the main, there must be a mutual mistake as to a material fact.71
Ambiguities.-Parol evidence is said to be admissible to explain an
ambiguity.7 2 But what is an ambiguity? An examination of two recent
Superior Court cases, the opinions of which appear in the same volume of
reports, should serve to demonstrate what the Pennsylvania law is believed
to be, and its obvious defects.
In Cirotte v. Wassel73 plaintiff was induced by defendant's statements
of the rental value of an apartment house to buy it from defendant for
$12,500. Plaintiff paid $1,000 down. The contract provided "Possession
to be delivered by deed and assignment of existing leases and O.P.A. regis-
trations." 74 At settlement, half of the ten O.P.A. registrations submitted
by defendant were "delinquent" registrations, and because they were de-
linquent, the rent the plaintiff anticipated he would be permitted to charge
for those five apartments was reduced after the writing was executed.
Plaintiff rescinded, and sued to recover the down payment on the theory
that the contract called for "O.P.A. registrations" filed in accordance with
the law or at rentals which had been approved by the O.P.A. The trial
judge nonsuited the plaintiff and held as a matter of law that the "delin-
quent registrations" complied with the contract. On appeal, the nonsuit
was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings because
the phrase in question was ambiguous, and "the proper construction of
the ambiguous phrase in the contract will be for the jury in the light of
all the circumstances including such acts and declarations of the parties
as indicate the intent with which the words were used." 75
69. Berardini v. Kay, 326 Pa. 481, 192 Atl. 882 (1937) ; Commonwealth, to use
v. Gudaitis, 323 Pa. 110, 186 AtI. 82 (1936); McCready's Estate, 316 Pa. 246, 175
Atl. 554 (1934) (the instrument contained a provision that the signing parties had
read it and knew its contents); Regional Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Barabas,
159 Pa. Super. 402, 48 A.2d 85 (1946).
70. Overholt v. Reliance Ins. Co., 319 Pa. 340, 179 Atl. 554 (1935).
71. Two cases granting relief are Mellinger's Estate, 334 Pa. 180, 5 A.2d 321
(1939) and Broida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 At. 492 (1934).
In Moore v. Moore, 344 Pa. 324,'25 A.2d 130 (1942), the court found that a
word had obviously been omitted, inserted it, and then refused to permit parol evi-
dence to be admitted to show the true intent and understanding because of the
parol evidence rule.
Cridge's Estate, 289 Pa. 331, 137 Atl. 455 (1931) held that the true considera-
tion may always be shown, but Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951),
expressly states that the true consideration may now be shown only if the stated
consideration is obviously nominal.
72. E.g., Waldman v. Shoemaker, 367 Pa. 587, 591, 80 A.2d 776 (1951); Secu-
rity Trust Co. v. Stapp, 332 Pa. 9, 13, 1 A.2d 236 (1938).
73. 163 Pa. Super. 292, 60 A.2d 339 (1948).
74. Italics supplied.
75. Cirotte v. Wassel, 163 Pa. Super. 292, 297, 60 A.2d 339, 341 (1948).
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In Black v. Cinquergrani,76 plaintiff contracted in writing to buy a
restaurant, furniture, fixtures, and the restaurant liquor license for $7,800
from defendant.7 7 The liquor board refunded to defendant the $600
he had prepaid for renewal before the date of agreement. The license would
have expired nineteen days after the agreed date of settlement. The board
then demanded and received $600 from plaintiff. When defendant refused
to indemnify plaintiff for the $600, plaintiff sued for the $600, and alleged
that both parties had agreed that all of the interest defendant had in the
liquor license was to be conveyed to plaintiff who was to pay nothing in
addition to the $7,800. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and defend-
ant appealed from a refusal to grant judgment n.o.v. The Superior Court
reversed, entered judgment for the defendant on authority of Gianni, and
held there was no ambiguity because "license" could not possibly mean
"license and fee."
These two cases show that in order for a phrase to be considered
ambiguous, it must be susceptible of two conventional meanings or inter-
pretations. If the asserted interpretation is not commonly accepted, it will
be rejected by the court no matter how probable it may be that the par-
ticular parties actually did mean what is being asserted.7 8 Thus, both
"delinquent" and "non delinquent" O.P.A. registrations are "O.P.A. regis-
trations," but "license and fee" is not "license." Parol evidence was ad-
mitted to explain "O.P.A. registrations," and inadmissible to explain
"license," but in view of the respective facts of the cases, it is as probable
that one set of parties did mean "license and fee" as that the other set meant
either one of the "registration" interpretations. In fact, in view of the d&
fendant having prepaid the license fee and receiving an apparent windfall in
its unanticipated refund, it seems more probable, as was proved to the
jury, 9 that "license and fee" was meant. But, because society does not
76. 163 Pa. Super. 157, 60 A.2d 898 (1948).
77. Italics supplied.
78. It is believed by the writers that this analysis will explain the bulk of the
Pennsylvania cases. Waldman v. Shoemaker, 367 Pa. 587, 80 A.2d 776 (1951)
("[defendants] shall forthwith pay the aforesaid sum of eighteen thousand ($18,000)
dollars" does not mean that payment is conditioned upon a profit accruing) ; Nallin-
Jennings Park Co. v. Sterling, 364 Pa. 611, 73 A.2d 390 (1950) (stipulation limiting
an easement for the use of defendants, "their heirs, successors, and assigns for
themselves, concessionaires, employees, tenants and suppliers of materials and opera-
tions" does not include defendant's patrons) ; Dahath Electric Co. v. Suburban Elec-
tric D. Co., 332 Pa. 129, 2 A.2d 765 (1938) (contract creating a distributing agency
referring to plaintiff as "the dealer" and the territory as "his territory" does not mean
"sole" or "exclusive" agency) ; see also Warner Co. v. North City Trust Co., 311
Pa. 1, 166 Atl. 230 (1933); Home B. & S. Co. v. Ruthrauff, 295 Pa. 237, 145 Atl.
129 (1929) ; Simsohn v. Wetter, 111 Pa. Super. 523, 174 Atl. 422 (1934).
In the following cases, the language was held to be ambiguous: Schwartz v.
Whelan, 295 Pa. 425, 145 Atl. 525 (1929); Simon v. Myers, 284 Pa. 3, 130 Atl.
256 (1925); Simmons v. Dietrich, 117 Pa. Super. 408, 177 Atl. 477 (1935) (evi-
dence admitted to show which of two newspapers having the same name was in-
tended); Koplin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 158 Pa. Super. 301, 44 A.2d 877 (1945)
(evidence admitted to show which of two buildings was insured).
79. In Nallin-Jennings Park Co. v. Sterling, 364 Pa. 611, 73 A.2d 390 (1950)
the Chancellor found an ambiguity existed as defendant contended, admitted parol
evidence, and held for defendant. The Supreme Court reversed and remitted the
record with instruction to give plaintiff the relief sought.
normally attach such a meaning to the word "license," this plaintiff was
denied recovery even though he had proved it was the meaning of these
parties.
Words have no eternal, objective meaning, but have a purely sub-
jective existence, and mean only what the particular individual or in-
dividuals believe they mean. 0 That society as a whole attaches a special
meaning to a word is only a strong indication, not conclusive proof, of
the meaning attached to it by the parties in question. Professor Wigmore
has lucidly articulated an objection to Pennsylvania's approach to the inter-
pretation of ambiguities.
"So long as men are allowed to grant and contract freely, and
so long as the law undertakes to carry out those acts by enforcement,
just so long must the standard of interpretation continue to be mobile,
subjective, and individual. Mr. Justice Brook once thought it 'bar-
barous' that a man should be 'assured that whatever words he made
use of, his meaning only should be considered.' But, as the law of
today has broken with his premise, so it must break with his conclu-
sion. The ordinary standard, or 'plain meaning,' is simply the mean-
ing of the people who did not write the document." 81
Summary.-If fraud, mistake, delivery or an ambiguity is involved the
actual intent is relevant; but in the usual "parol evidence rule" case, the
apparent intent is relevant.8 2 Fraud and mistake are rules of substantive law
designed to permit one party to show that no contract ever existed, and the
parol evidence rule is not a bar to ascertaining actual intent. On the other
hand, where one party tries to show no contract existed because of an un-
fulfilled oral condition precedent to the existence of a contract, or that
neither party intended to be bound, the parol evidence rule commands that
the apparent intent must control. Once it is accepted that relief should be
granted when fraud or mistake is proved by "clear, precise and indubitable
evidence," why should there not be a similar result when it could be proved
by the same caliber of proof that there was no intent to contract, or that a
condition precedent was not fulfilled? Unless there are policy reasons to
80. "The fallacy [of the plain meaning rule] consists in assuming that there is
or ever can be some one real or absolute meaning. In truth, there can be only some
persoa's meaning; and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the writer
of the document." 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 191, 192.
81. 9 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 191.
"Mr. Justice Holmes once gave us the dictum that 'you cannot prove a mere
private convention between the two parties'to give language a different meaning from
its common one. It would open too great risks if evidence were admissible to show
that when they said five hundred feet they agreed it should mean one hundred
inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument should signify the Old South Church.' It is
believed, however, that the great judge was in error. The risks that he says would
be 'too great' are in fact being carried. They are not so great as he feared; we
must remember that one asserting that 'five hundred feet' was used to mean 'one
hundred inches' bears the heavy risk of not being able to persuade the court and
jury that it is true. Often he would need the corroboration of a written code signed
by the other party or some special custom or usage of some class of people." 3
CoRBiN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 253, 254.
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justify these varying results, it is evident that the Pennsylvania cases are
not in complete harmony.
ACTUAL INTENT VERSUS APPARENT INTENT
Whenever the apparent instead of the actual intent of the parties is
made operative, a substantial risk of imposing non-consensual contractual
obligations upon the parties is incurred. What ends are deemed sufficiently
important to warrant binding parties to a "contract" to which they did not
assent, and are the means employed suitable for achieving the desired ends?
Can the ends be reached in a way that will also give effect to the actual
intent of the parties?
Little detailed discussion of policy exists in the cases in which the
parol evidence rule is applied. Usually, the explanation takes the form
of the nebulous statement that the "integrity of written instruments
must be preserved." 83 Several distinct driving forces can be segregated,
however. A main one is the belief that security of business trans-
actions requires that the parties be able decisively to terminate success-
ful negotiations and crystallize their agreement into immutable evidence
for future reference should dispute over the terms arise. Probably there is
also present an underlying thought of social engineering with the objective
of a greater use of writings in the business world to be accomplished by
penalizing the careless and negligent. There is certainly a very real fear
of perjury. Lastly, it seems ethically repugnant for a person to contradict
statements he has previously made, and especially when he has reduced
them to writing. But, even in the face of these arguments, there is very
respectable authority advocating that actual, not apparent, intent should
control.84 In short, that all relevant evidence should be considered. What
then is wrong with the reasons advanced above for seeking only apparent
intent?
Professor McCormick suggests that the necessity of certainty in busi-
ness has been accepted by the courts as self-evident without any empirical
basis, 5 but there is little doubt that some certainty in commercial dealings
is desirable no matter how unascertainable the extent. It is vitally im-
portant to recognize, however, that in our society where almost any type
of contract can be effected orally, and almost any type of writing can be
orally modified or abrogated, absolute certainty in business dealings, assum-
ing it to be desirable, cannot be achieved through the use of writings. Since
82. However, if both parties admit that there was an outstanding oral agreement,
the actual intent is sought even in the usual "parol evidence rule" case. Fed. Res.
Bk. Phila. v. Gearon, 331 Pa. 65; 200 At. 80 (1938); Allinger v. Melvin, 315 Pa.
298, 172 Atl. 712 (1934); Newland v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 315 Pa. 193, 173 Atl.
822 (1934) ; Ward v. Ziegler, 285 Pa. 557, 132 Atl. 798 (1926).
83. E.g., Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 325, 126 Atl. 791, 792 (1924) ;
Independent Coat Co. v. Michalowski, 349 Pa. 349, 351, 37 A.2d 518, 519 (1944);
Russell v. Sickles, 306 Pa. 586, 591, 160 AtI. 610, 611 (1932) ; Colonial Mfg. Co. v.
Carideo, 142 Pa. Super. 485, 492, 16 A.2d 731, 734 (1940).
84. See note 7 supra.
85. McCormick, supra note 4, at 365-366.
the parties need not execute a writing to create contractual relations in most
situations, and since even if they do choose to do so, the legal effect of the
writing may subsequently be changed by oral transactions, the law gives
them no compelling reason to hold sacred the writing itself.
By granting virtually absolute legal sanctity to writings, injustice must
result, for then the law does not conform to the needs of human behavior
which, unlike the law, refuses to sanctify written instruments. Herein lies
the fatal flaw of the Pennsylvania approach: it is simply not suited for many
common, everyday business dealings. People cannot always put their entire
agreement in writing because circumstances sometimes prohibit it. The
consummation of many business transactions depends upon the amicable
relationship between the parties, and for one party to insist adamantly
(indeed, perhaps even suggest) that an oral promise be added to the writing
may be interpreted as a manifestation of distrust. Sometimes it would be
natural to let the situation ride, for probably, the oral agreement would be
fulfilled. True, if it were not, there would be a rupture of relations as bad
as any that could occur during the execution of the writing, but the risk
of having a good faith oral business agreement not performed seems less
than that of a falling out due to tactless insistence upon a reduction to
writing. But, even where no risk of preventing the closing of the deal
exists, there is still an inherent reluctance in sensitive persons to intimate
that another is not trusted.
The Pennsylvania approach may also reflect an underlying sentiment of,
"Well, he asked for it, he should have known better, and he has no one
but himself to blame." This position is unsound on two grounds. First,
there may be little reason to say that the average layman should have known
better. Perhaps in the ideal society, all terms of every transaction would
be reduced to writing, but that this is not our society must be recognized.
Also, it is significant that if the quantity of litigation over the parol evidence
rule is a reliable indication, our society is little closer to the ideal today
than when Gianni v. Russell & Co. anhounced a "new or modern parol
evidence rule." 86 Rare is the volume of reports that has no cases concern-
ing the parol evidence rule. Not only was the rule of Gianni v. Russell &
Co. out of line with some business practices when promulgated, but it seems
not to have succeeded in working a reform in these twenty eight years. If
everybody knew of the parol evidence rule, there might be no excuse for
any part of an agreement being oral, but while well counseled business men
may be aware of the rule, it is seriously doubted that the average layman
now is, or presently shall be.
Second, the principle of imposing upon the more blameworthy party
a loss which his conduct occasioned is not pertinent to the application of
the parol evidence rule. Even if the party asserting the existence of the
oral agreement was grossly careless in not having it reduced to writing,
the other party has still suffered no loss. Instead, unless compelled to
86. So characterized in Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 597, 79 A.2d 255, 258
(1951).
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perform a perfectly valid promise, the latter will be benefited at the expense
of the former. It is the existence of an oral agreement that is being asserted,
and if a lack of integration can be proved, the party contending integration
could not have justifiably relied upon the writing as embodying the entire
agreement, for it will have been proved that he himself did not so view
the writing. If it can be proved that the parties were not concerned with
the integrity of the written instrument, it seems hardly correct for the court
to give to it integrity, and especially for the benefit of the breaching party.
The real core of the Pennsylvania approach is probably the bugaboo
of perjury 87 and self-serving, slippery memory.s8  This fear has resulted
in the refusal to consider any outside evidence.. If there can be no testi-
mony at all, there can certainly be no perjured testimony. Possibly the
courts' attitude is that the ordinary factual situation of one party asserting
the existence of an unintegrated oral agreement is peculiarly susceptible to
perjury. The danger of perjury, however great or small it may be, is just
as strong in cases where actual intent is sought, such as those in which one
party can testify to an absence of delivery; 89 or where both parties admit
the writing was no integration and testify as to the actual terms of the con-
tract; 90 or where one party attempts to show fraud,91 mutual mistake,92 or
to explain an ambiguity; 93 or, asserts a subsequent modification or rescis-
sion; 94 or, indeed, wherever the parties introduce conflicting evidence. It
cannot be seriously contended that the testimony will be less biased or more
trustworthy in the above situations than where merely an oral unintegrated
agreement is alleged. In none of these cases must the evidence necessarily
be believed, and it may always be rejected if found not credible or of small
probative value; but, it is entirely different to refuse even to listen to the
87. The opinion by Justice Kephart in Speiev v. Michelson, 303 Pa. 66, 69-70,
154 Atl. 127, 128 (1931) traces the historical development of the Pennsylvania parol
evidence rule, and shows that admissibility of parol evidence was sharply curtailed
when parties in interest were made competent witnesses.
"Perjury is one of the great bugaboos of the law. Every change in procedure
by which the disclosure of the truth has been made easier has raised the spectre
of perjury to, frighten the profession. It was only in 1851 that Lord Brougham's
Act for the first time made the parties to civil actions competent to testify in the
higher courts of England. There was great dread of the Act, lest the interest of
the parties should prove too powerful an incentive to false swearing. . .. But
the fear that the temptation to perjury would ruin the value of interested parties has
so completely vanished that no one would seriously think of restoring the disquali-
fication." Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J.
863, 867 (1933).
88. Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 596, 79 A.2d 255, 257, 258 (1951).
Coke reports Popham, C.J., as saying, in the Countess of Rutland's case: "Also
it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration,
and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties, should be
controlled by averment of the parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of
slippery memory." 5 Co. REP. 26A (1604).
89. See cases cited, note 45 supra.
90. See cases cited, note 82 supra.
91. See cases cited, note 63 supra.
92. See cases cited, note 71 supra.
93. See cases cited, notes 73 and 78 supra.
94. See cases cited, note 6 supra.
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testimony because it might not be credible. This danger of perjury exists
whenever a party in interest is permitted to testify. If the safeguards
against perjury are sufficient in any case where the parties may testify, they
should be sufficient in the usual parol evidence rule case; and even if they
are not adequate in the ordinary case, the means exist now to impose
adequate safeguards in parol evidence rule cases.
Paradoxically, Pennsylvania's position might possibly even encourage
a type of perjury which may be practiced with complete impunity. It has
been shown that if both parties admit lack of integration, the parol evi-
dence rule is avoided, but that a plea of integration by the one against whom
lack of integration is asserted prevents the issue from being raised if the
writing is complete, and the oral agreement would "naturally and normally"
have been included within the written. 95 In the latter situation, judgment
may be given on the pleadings if there is no other basis for the cause
of action or defense, and a demurrer is not deemed an "admission" for this
purpose. 96 If there is a trial on other issues, evidence of the oral agree-
ment may not be introduced. This means that there is no way of detecting
the truth of the denial--obviously, an engraved invitation for perjured
pleadings is extended.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
There is a solution to all of the facets of this problem which may be
achieved without legislative assistance: all evidence will be considered, but,
in order to satisfy the burden of proof imposed upon the proponent of the
oral agreement, the necessary quantum and quality of his evidence will vary
directly with the improbability of his contention. This evidence need not be
believed merely because it must be considered. "There is no necessity for
being gullible or simple minded." 97 But, if the absence of integration could
have been proved, to deny the opportunity seems palpably wrong.
This may be illustrated by reference to the type of factual situation
which would seem to present the strongest case for excluding the offered
95. See cases cited, notes 30-33 supra.
96. "The able young counsel for appellant ingeniously argued that upon a rule for
judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, plaintiff necessarily admits all
the averments of the affidavit of defense and, consequently, since it is here admitted
that there was an oral agreement relating to payment of the instruments, the trade
acceptances did not represent the entire contract between the parties, and evidence
of the parol agreement is admissible to vary the effect of the written. However, de-
fendant's assertion that the trade acceptances did not represent the entire agreement
of the parties is his own conclusion from the pleadings and not an admission of the
plaintiff. The effect of plaintiff's rule for judgment is not to admit a conclusion of
law, but merely to assert that the facts set forth in the affidavit of defense, even
though trie, would not be admissible under the parol evidence rule. We have re-
peatedly stated that a strict compliance with the rule excluding evidence is neces-
sary to uphold the integrity of written instruments. It cannot be circumvented
in the manner here contended, else the whole purpose of the rule would be defeated.
The cases relied upon by appellant are not in point, for in all of them the facts
showed that plaintiff admitted the instrument sued upon did not represent the entire
contract between the parties; we find no such admission here." (italics supplied).
Architectural Tile Co. v. McSorley, 311 Pa. 299-301, 166 AtI. 913-914 (1933).
97. 3 CoRBIN, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 217.
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evidence. Suppose the written instrument contains a self integrating clause
stating that the writing is the entire agreement, and supersedes all others
both written or oral. What is to be the effect of this provision? 98 It should
be considered only as evidence of integration, but not conclusive. 99 The
probative value of the clause with respect to what the parties really in-
tended might be quite small if the clause is part of a standard form and is
inconspicuously placed in the writing; conversely, the probative value might
be overwhelming if the clause is boldly written in long hand across the
face of the instrument. It may seem appealing in the last situation that then,
but only then, the writing should be conclusive. But even here no writing
should be conclusive of itself. This is not to say that it may not be the most
important single piece of evidence, as it undoubtedly is, but only that it
cannot prove itself. There is no way of determining the strength of the
proof offered to negate the effect of the self integrating clause unless the
proof is considered, and it seems neither fair nor sensible to deny one party
the chance to prove his contention, because it appears most unlikely he will
be able to do so. If he cannot prove it, nothing has been lost by having
permitted him to try; if he could have proved his point, and was not per-
mitted to do so, the result is disastrous.
The results would be equally disastrous if the party asserting the oral
agreement could not have proved it by legitimate evidence, but succeeds
in doing so through perjured testimony. Perjury appears to be the one
serious danger to using the suggested "burden of proof" test, but existing
procedures may be utilized to combat both this evil, and also whatever
inherent prejudice the jury may possess for the economic underdog who, it
has been contended, is usually asserting the oral agreement.10 0
98. See generally, Comment, Special Provisions in Contracts To Exclude Con-
tentions Based Upon Parol Evidence, 32 ILL. L. REv. 938 (1938).
99. Only one Pennsylvania case has been found where relief was granted in the
face of a self integrating clause. Smilow v. Dickerson, 357 Pa. 455, 54 A.2d 883
(1947). See text at note 52 supra. The presence of such a clause has been con-
clusive. E.g., Dahath Electric Co. v. Suburban Electric D. Co., 332 Pa. 129, 2
A.2d 765 (1938) ; Hill & Mac!illan, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 Pa. 18, 155 Atl. 103 (1931) ;
Hauer v. Martin, 284 Pa. 407, 131 Atl. 187 (1925) ; Lloyd & Elliott, Inc. v. Lang,
118 Pa. Super. 190, 180 Atl. 74 (1935) ; Sterling Eng. & Mfg. Corp. v. Jennings, 101
Pa. Super. 291 (1930).
100. It has been suggested that the entire concept of a parol evidence rule is
simply a procedural device for control of the jury. The theory is that in most
cases the party asserting the existence of the parol agreement is the economic under-
dog, and the jury, composed of economic underdogs, will favor him regardless of the
improbability of his story. The judge, distrusting the jury because of this inherent
bias, first listens to the evidence. If he is satisfied it is credible, he will hold either
that there is no integration, or that the facts fit into one of the elastic exceptions,
and sends the issue to the jury; if he does not so believe, he will declare the evidence
to which he has already listened inadmissible because of the parol evidence rule. It
will be noted that if this analysis were true, all relevant evidence would be con-
sidered in each case, and, the only question would be by whom. McCormick, op.
cit. supra note 4.
But, however accurate may be this description of the manner in which the rule
operates in other jurisdiction, it is not true in Pennsylvania. This is proved by the
numerous cases in which the judgment is decided upon the pleadings, for in those
cases, the evidence is considered by no one. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66,
66 A.2d 309 (1949); Chanin v. J. B. Liebman & Co., 341 Pa. 552, 20 A.2d 208
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It was expressly stated in Gianni v. Russell & Co., "This question
[of integration] must be determined by the court." 101 There was no
elaboration of that bare assertion, and none has been found in any Penn-
sylvania case decided after it. This doctrine effects an obvious usurpation
of the jury's function. The issue of intent should be, normally, a question
for the jury. The underlying reason for reserving it to the court must be
a distrust for untrained juries possibly biased in favor of the economic
underdog. Faced with the problem that "the integrity of written instru-
ments" has little persuasive effect upon a jury pulling for the "little fellow,"
the courts entrusted the judge with the duty of determining the intent. If
the Pennsylvania courts had permitted the judge to listen to all of the evi-
dence before making his determination instead of requiring him to make a
decision on limited information, the approach would admit of little criticism.
Then, actual intent would be operative, and the danger of perjury, omni-
present in our judicial system, would be met as far as is practical, by per-
mitting the judge, trained by experience, to decide the issue. The only
method of completely eliminating the perjury threat would be to adopt the
method of the Pennsylvania courts, which is to forbid the admission of
testimony completely-obviously a Pyrrhic victory. Since the issue of
integration is already recognized to be a question for the judge, it is be-
lieved that a solution to the perjury problem which should be effective and
just can be easily achieved.
It is apparent that in any proceedings in a court of equity, or at law
with jury trial waived, the suggested solution could be a reality immediately.
There is no right to a jury trial in equity and the problem of jury distrust
is not even remotely present. There seems no justifiable excuse for deny-
ing the chancellor, as the Pennsylvania courts do, the right to listen to all
of the evidence.
Certain difficulties may be presented, however, whenever the case is to
be tried by a jury. One proposal, the reverse of the Pennsylvania approach,
would be to discard any special treatment for written instruments, and
handle the problem exactly as any issue of fact.10 2 The jury would deter-
mine whether or not there was an integration, unless the usual preliminary
tests for submitting the evidence to the jury had not been met, whereupon
the judge would rule as a matter of law. It is certainly within the power
of the courts to proceed so if they wished, but the approach may be un-
desirable because it would ignore the possible incapacity or unwillingness
of the jury to make an accurate determination. Despite its defects, this
approach is still more desirable than the existing Pennsylvania rule.
(1941) ; Hambleton v. Hartman, 160 Pa. Super. 447, 51 A.2d 511 (1947) ; Regional
Ag. Credit Corp. v. Barabas, 159 Pa. Super. 402, 48 A.2d 85 (1946) ; Silberman v.
Crane, 158 Pa. Super. 186, 44 A.2d 598 (1945). Contra: Friend, Conservator v.
Kuhn, 316 Pa. 233, 175 Atl. 690 (1934), but this case has been so construed and
distinguished as presently to lack vitality.
101. 281 Pa. 321, 324, 126 Atl. 791, 792 '(1924). See also Lester v. Century In-
demnity Co., 356 Pa. 15, 50 A.2d 678 (1947); Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 599,
63 A.2d 9, 11 (1949).
102. 3 CoRnin, op. cit. supra note 3, § 595.
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The best procedure would be to leave the issue of integration pre-
liminarily to the judge. He would weigh the testimony in terms of prob-
ability, credibility, and whatever other imponderable considerations are
involved in judging oral testimony. If he decides there was an integration,
the issue would be closed and the question would never be submitted to the
jury. If he is reasonably convinced from all of the evidence that there was
no integration, the judge would then charge the jury to find what the actual
terms of the agreement were. The jury, of course, should not be bound
by the judge's preliminary determination that the writing was not the whole
agreement, and may consider the issue de novo.
Two objections may be levelled at this suggested approach. First,
passing upon the credibility of witnesses is traditionally within the province
of the jury ' 03 and the suggested approach makes it a function of the judge.
This criticism seems specious. The courts were not loath to remove com-
pletely from the jury the entire issue of integration which includes, passing
upon the witnesses' credibility. If the issue of credibility can be completely
abolished, it would seem it might be transferred to the province of the
judge. It would be more sensible to judge the credibility of the witnesses
after listening to and observing them. Furthermore, it is not uncommon
for judges to pass on credibility, for in addition to the usual equity cases,
judges pass upon credibility in deciding petitions to open judgment 104 and
in some proceedings in the Orphans' Court.10 5 Lastly, in the "fraud" cases,
the judge may not submit the issue of fraud to the jury unless he finds the
evidence "clear, precise and indubitable." 1o6 This determination cannot
be made without considering the credibility of the witnesses. In short,
permitting a judge to consider credibility for the purpose of deciding what
the parties intended should be no objection.
A second objection may have more merit. How can it be insured that
the jury will not be swayed by the testimony the judge must hear when he
determines thet issue of integration? Suppose the judge finds integration;
how then is the jury, its sympathy aroused by the testimony, to be prevented
from bringing in a verdict for the proponent of the oral agreement arrived
at by reason of the consideration of this testimony? The whole problem
might be resolved by having the judge take the testimony outside of the
jury's hearing, and if he finds no integration, have the proceedings repeated
in the jury's presence. Most unfortunately, this device seems impractical,
for the courts do not have the time to hear evidence twice. More im-
103. Steffenson v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 361 Pa. 317, 319, 64 A.2d 785,
787 (1949) ; O'Farrell v. Mawson, 320 Pa. 316, 320, 182 Atl. 538, 540 (1936).
104. "In determining whether or not a judgment should be opened, the court
below is required to weigh the evidence of both parties, consider the credibility of
the witnesses, give due effect to writings which cannot be subject to bias or forget-
fulness. . . ." (italics supplied). Nelly v. Diskin, 113 Pa. Super. 249, 252, 173
AtI. 735, 736 (1934).
105. Gaston Estate, 361 Pa. 105, 62 A.2d 904 (1949).
106. See text at note 63 supra.
portant, the punch and spontaneity would be gone from both direct and
cross-examination when repeated.
The only practical solution seems to be for the judge to instruct the
jury to disregard the evidence to which he has listened, but which failed
to prove to him that there was a lack of integration. It is admitted that
this may not be ideally satisfactory because it is questionable whether the
jury will in fact obey the judge's instruction to ignore the testimony. But,
the problem is most common to the law of evidence; evidence is often ad-
mitted for one purpose and no other. In fact, the hazard is presently being
risked in the parol evidence rule cases where fraud and mistake are at-
tempted to be proved. If the judge finds the evidence not to be "clear,
precise and indubitable," he has no alternative but to instruct the jury to
disregard the already admitted evidence.
On the other hand, there are at least two ameliorating factors to this
weakness. First, it must not be overlooked that the jury may well follow
the judge's instructions, and ignore the parol evidence. Second, the prob-
lem will probably seldom arise, for the assertion of the parol agreement is
frequently the only basis for the cause of action or defense. If so, and the
judge finds integration, the case would be closed immediately. If he does
not, the jury will have to consider the evidence to determine the actual
terms of the contract. Even if there were more than one basis for the
defense or cause of action, there are procedural devices for controlling a
jury verdict justifiable only if the jury believed the evidence they have been
instructed to ignore, since the verdict would be against the weight of the
evidence. The use of the special verdict could be particularly helpful.
Thus, only in the following situation could the possible weakness of the
suggested solution produce injustice: the action must be at law, there must
be a jury, the judge must have found integration, and there must be alter-
nate grounds for the cause of action or defense. The slight risk of injustice,
present in only this one type of situation, is dwarfed by the magnitude of
the risk present whenever the Pennsylvania courts apply its "modem parol
evidence rule."
CONCLUSION
The suggested solution would dispel the enigma called the "parol
evidence rule." A procedural certainty which would not sacrifice simplicity
would be afforded, and should be heartily welcomed. It would be known,
and understood, that the issue involved in the application of the parol evi-
dence rule is merely the intent of the parties and that it will be resolved
as it usually is, namely, by the submission of evidence. The fruitless and
tedious searching of precedents to find some maverick upon which to base
the argument that the evidence in the case at hand should be considered
would be unnecessary. The frustrating distinctions on distinctions would
be eliminated. The wasteful appeals from futile attempts in the lower courts
to make out a case of "fraud," "mistake" or "ambiguity" would be avoided.
In short, a sensible rule would exist.
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Pennsylvania courts have an even stronger reason for adopting a
change, as was recognized in the case of Friend, Conservator v. Kuhn, 08
which case has not been followed, and has been distinguished so repeatedly
as to be presently without vitality.0 9 Defendant was executrix of the
estate of her husband who owed plaintiff bank the amount of a note given
by him to it. After he died, the note fell due, and an officer of plaintiff
bank asked defendant to execute a renewal note. In complying with the
request, defendant signed it on the front in the capacity of an executrix, and
endorsed it as a guarantor on the back. When plaintiff sued on the en-
dorsement, defendant pleaded that it was understood that she had signed
purely for plaintiff's accommodation, and was told at the execution of the
note that her endorsement was merely a formality, and she was to be no
way liable upon it. Plaintiff's motion for judgment for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense was denied, which ruling was affirmed upon appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the parol evidence rule was not to be applied
on motion for judgment on the pleading, and the reason it gave for so
holding is the essence of the criticism here. Assuming that defendant could
have proved her allegations, the court said:
would any one assert that, under such circumstances, she
would nevertheless be held liable. Such a conclusion would be so far
from the realms of justice as not to be thinkable. . . ." 1D *
David N. Bressler
William J. Taylor
108. 316 Pa. 233, 175 At. 690 (1934).
109. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 362 Pa. 66, 72, 66 A.2d 309 (1949); German-
town Trust Co. v. Emhardt (No. 1), 321 Pa. 561, 565-566, 184 Atl. 457, 459 (1936) ;
Hambleton v. Hartman, 160 Pa. Super. 447, 450-451, 51 A.2d 511, 513 (1947);
Silberman v. Crane, 158 Pa. Super. 186, 188, 44 A.2d 598, 599 (1945).
110. Friend, Conservator v. Kuhn, 316 Pa. 233, 236, 175 Atl. 690, 691 (1934).
* For views generally contrary to those expressed herein, see a recently pub-
lished Note, 19 U. op Cxi. L. Rzv. 348 (1952).
